[secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats-04

Matthew Lepinski <mlepinski.ietf@gmail.com> Mon, 10 June 2013 04:13 UTC

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Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2013 00:13:25 -0400
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From: Matthew Lepinski <mlepinski.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats@tools.ietf.org
Subject: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats-04
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

This document provides a taxonomy of attacks against the Mobile Ad Hoc
Network Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) [RFC 6130]. The document
also contains a discussion of the impact of these attacks on running on top
of NHDP (in particular, OLSRv2 and SMF)

Having reviewed the document, I do not see substantial issues in the
document. I believe it is reasonable to publish as an informational RFC.

*One minor issue:* The replay attack described in Section 4.5 did not seem
substantially different than the attacks described in Section 4.4. It is
not clear to me how replaying a message from another part of the network is
any worse (or substantially different) than just fabricating a message
claiming connectivity that does not exist (i.e., like what is described in
4.4.2). I would recommend either deleting 4.5 or else clarifying how these
attacks are substantially different.

*Trivial nit:* In Section 5, "a Compromised NHDP router will seek to
manipulate" -- substitute "may seek" instead of "will seek". We don't know
for certain what a compromised router will do (unless one assigns clear
motivation to the adversary, which this document does not).