[secdir] re-review of draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem

[Stephen Kent <[e-mail]>]

I reviewed version 05 of this I-D in July of 2008.  The current version is 10.

My original reviewed cited only a two major concerns:

	- the previous version was ambiguous about support for 
Camella. This version clarifies this issue, making support for 
Camellia a SHOULD.

	- the pervious version called for using an algorithm ID (with 
very complex parameters) in a cert to signal when a message recipient 
requires use of RSA-KEM. The authors addressed this concern in 
Section 2.3 (and Appendix B), by stating that these parameters MUST 
be absent when this OID is used in a cert in this context.

I have corresponded with Sean and he suggested that he could provide 
more explicit words re the fact that the parameters MUST be omitted 
when the algorithm OID appears in the SubjectPublicKey field of a 
cert. I encourage Sean to include this additional text.

Steve