[secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-dhc-access-network-identifier-08

Catherine Meadows <catherine.meadows@nrl.navy.mil> Thu, 25 June 2015 14:56 UTC

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Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 10:56:11 -0400
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Subject: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-dhc-access-network-identifier-08
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
these comments just like any other last call comments.

This draft specifies the format and mechanisms used for encoding network identifiers in DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 by defining new access identifier options and sub-options.
The Security Considerations section gives a discussion of the security risks in using DHCP and their mitigation.  However, what needs to be go in the Security Considerations
Section is a discussion of the security risks raised by *this* document and possible mitigation.  The information about DHCP security risks is useful, but not of primary importance.

My impression is that this document gives formats for presenting fields whose use is already discussed in previous RFC’s, e.g. RFC3315, in which case there are no new
security considerations.  If that is so, then the Security Considerations Section should
include (preferably begin with) a statement to the effect that, since this document only gives instructions for formatting and encoding fields whose use has already been specified
in these previous RFC’s, it presents no additional security considerations beyond what is covered in those RFCs.  If that is not the case, you should say what new security risks are introduced
by *this* draft, e.g. does it enable a use of DHCP that was not possible before and could cause a new type of security risk if DHCP was used without authentication?

Recommendation:  Ready With Issues

Cathy Meadows

Catherine Meadows
Naval Research Laboratory
Code 5543
4555 Overlook Ave., S.W.
Washington DC, 20375
phone: 202-767-3490
fax: 202-404-7942
email: catherine.meadows@nrl.navy.mil