Re: [secdir] (Security sections) SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-ietf-storm-iscsi-cons-06
Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> Thu, 11 October 2012 11:38 UTC
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Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 12:38:24 +0100
From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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To: "Black, David" <david.black@emc.com>
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Cc: Mallikarjun Chadalapaka <cbm@chadalapaka.com>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-storm-iscsi-cons.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-storm-iscsi-cons.all@tools.ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] (Security sections) SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-ietf-storm-iscsi-cons-06
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Hi David, On 09/10/2012 17:14, Black, David wrote: >> Hi Alexey, here are the responses to your comments specific to security >> sections of iSCSI consolidated draft - actually, I am deferring mostly to >> Julian and David who are better suited than me to comment on this area, :-) > That would be my cue ... inline ... > >>> In 9.3.1: >>> >>> - HMAC-SHA1 MUST be implemented [RFC2404]. >>> >>> RFC 2404 seems to define HMAC-SHA-1-96, not HMAC-SHA1. >> [Mallikarjun:] That is true. I do not know the reason for this citing. >> Julian/David? >> >> I also found it interesting that the abstract for 2404 itself does not use the >> "96" qualifier. > IPsec uses HMAC-SHA1 with its output truncated to 96 bits. HMAC-SHA1 was > used here as being a more recognizable algorithm name, but the specific > requirements of RFC 2404 do apply. Here's some revised text that handles > both concerns: > > - HMAC-SHA1 MUST be implemented in the specific form of HMAC-SHA-1-96 [RFC2404]. I like this. Thanks. >>> 9.3.2. Confidentiality >>> >>> The NULL encryption algorithm MUST also be implemented. >>> >>> I find it odd that the section talks about how weak DES is and then >>> requires NULL encryption to be supported. What is the reason for this? >> [Mallikarjun:] IIRC, I *think* this was because we wanted implementations to >> be able to use the authentication/MAC of IPSec suite, without forcing them >> always to use encryption. David, can you please add/correct? > Mallikarjun is basically correct, but there's more to explain. > > The NULL encryption algorithm is needed to allow use of ESP for authentication > (cryptographic integrity) without encryption. This is often preferred to AH > for that purpose, especially in hardware implementations. Ok. >>> 9.3.3. Policy, Security Associations, and Cryptographic Key >>> Management >>> >>> - When digital signatures are used to achieve authentication, >>> an IKE negotiator SHOULD use IKE Certificate Request >>> Payload(s) to specify the certificate authority. IKE >>> negotiators SHOULD check the pertinent Certificate >>> Revocation List (CRL) before accepting a PKI certificate for >>> use in IKE authentication procedures. >>> >>> What are the reasons for these requirements being SHOULD level (as >>> opposed to MUST level)? > There are environments in which a small number of certificates are statically > configured as trust anchors in which these mechanisms may not be needed. I think mentioning this would be useful. >>> - The following identification type requirements apply to IKEv1. >>> ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR (if the protocol stack supports >>> IPv6) and ID_FQDN Identification Types MUST be supported; >>> ID_USER_FQDN SHOULD be supported. The IP Subnet, IP Address >>> Range, ID_DER_ASN1_DN, and ID_DER_ASN1_GN Identification Types >>> SHOULD NOT be used. The ID_KEY_ID Identification Type MUST NOT >>> be used. >>> >>> It would be good to know the reason for the last SHOULD NOT and the last >>> MUST NOT. >> [Mallikarjun:] I will defer to Julian and David on these. > Sure ... this was done back in RFC 3270 and is being carried forward > from there (i.e., none of these requirements are new). > > IP Subnet and IP Address Range are too broad to usefully identify an > iSCSI endpoint, hence they are "SHOULD NOT". > > The _DN and _GN types are X.500 identities; unless one is a PKI > expert, the better approach is usually to use subjectAltName. > The primary reason for the "SHOULD NOT" was to warn those who > are not PKI experts away from X.500 identities. > > ID_KEY_ID is not interoperable as specified in RFC 2407 > ("opaque byte stream which may be used to pass vendor-specific > information"), hence they are "MUST NOT". > > Should explanatory text for these be added to the draft? I think this would be useful. It might also help you with revising the document in the future.
- Re: [secdir] (Security sections) SecDir and AppsD… Alexey Melnikov
- [secdir] (Security sections) SecDir and AppsDir r… Mallikarjun Chadalapaka
- Re: [secdir] (Security sections) SecDir and AppsD… Black, David