Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-ntf-09

Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com> Tue, 26 October 2021 14:57 UTC

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From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2021 10:57:11 -0400
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To: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, draft-ietf-opsawg-ntf.all@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-ntf-09
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On Tue, Oct 26, 2021 at 6:26 AM Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
wrote:
...

>  the Security Considerations covers
> everything I can think of in regards to data confidentiality, privacy,
> access control, etc.
>

I disagree on this point.

The draft mentions privacy in exactly two places.

First, in Background:

>   It is easy to see that network operations can benefit from
>   network big data to gather insights into flows without breaching
>   privacy.

This statement is presented without justification.  I disagree.  If
anything, it is hard to see how network operations can collect "big data"
_without_ breaching privacy.  The techniques described in this draft are
technically identical to the Pervasive Monitoring attack documented in RFC
7258.

Second, in the Security Considerations:

>   In addition to security, privacy is also an important issue.  Network
>   telemetry means to improve the network operation which can ultimately
>   benefit end user's quality of experience.  The network operators must
>   be held accountable and strive for a balance between managing the
>   network and maintaining the user privacy of that network.

I don't think the IETF should be publishing drafts that recommend
compromising user privacy, and I find the qualifications here vague and
toothless.

Although I view these as serious concerns, I think they can be remedied
quite easily.  It seems clear to me that the focus of this draft is on
"technical" networks whose endpoints do not represent users.  When all
endpoints on the network represent a single administrative entity, user
privacy concerns are largely inapplicable.  To that end, I would replace
these two paragraphs with:

> When a network's endpoints do not represent individual users (e.g. in
industrial, datacenter, and infrastructure contexts), network operations
can often benefit from large-scale data collection without breaching user
privacy.

and

> Large-scale network data collection is a major threat to user privacy
[RFC7258].  The Network Telemetry Framework is not applicable to networks
whose endpoints represent individual users, such as general-purpose access
networks.  Any collection or retention of data in those networks must be
tightly limited to protect user privacy.