Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-mpls-sfl-framework-08

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 25 September 2020 20:12 UTC

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Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 13:12:23 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-mpls-sfl-framework-08
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Hi Tero,

Thanks for the review -- I tried to restate the potential new security
issue in my No Objection ballot, so that the authors can analyze it and
come up with an appropriate response/mitigation.

-Ben

On Thu, Jul 02, 2020 at 03:30:25PM -0700, Tero Kivinen via Datatracker wrote:
> Reviewer: Tero Kivinen
> Review result: Has Issues
> 
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
> effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
> comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
> directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
> 
> This document describes a way to make synonyms for MPLS flows so those
> flows can be processed differently. It does include privacy considerations
> which says that depending on how the synonyms are used there might
> be privacy issues. 
> 
> It does claim in the security considerations section that there is no new
> security issues associated with the MPLS dataplane. I think that is not true.
> If there is any kind of different processing depending which synonym
> is used that can be used to bypass that processing by using the another
> synonym instead of the intended one. For example if attacker knows 
> that specific synonym causes deep packet inspection (one of the examples
> given), and he might want to use the synonym which bypasses this 
> inspection, in case he is sending things he does not want to be 
> inspected. This could be some kind of malicious code somehow
> loaded to the sending device or something.
> 
> On the other hand my understanding that trust model of MPLS
> is mostly we blindly trust everything other end says, so someone
> able to use different synonyms are most likely also able to do 
> other even worse things, but I think there are new things caused
> by this addition than what is already present in the MPLS now.
> 
> 
> 
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