Re: [secdir] Fwd: Secdir review of draft-paxson-tcpm-rfc2988bis-02
Vern Paxson <vern@ICIR.org> Fri, 22 April 2011 02:28 UTC
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Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2011 19:28:13 -0700
From: Vern Paxson <vern@ICIR.org>
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Cc: draft-paxson-tcpm-rfc2988bis.all@tools.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] Fwd: Secdir review of draft-paxson-tcpm-rfc2988bis-02
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> ... Even if some attacker can > convince a sender to reduce its RTO and hence trip the RTO early this > will *reduce* the sender's rate (RFC5681). D'oh, yeah, I should have directly flagged that, because that's pretty much the argument in a nutshell: any time the sender acts on RTO, its sending rate is going to near-nil, and the DoS issues get greatly diminished with this. Vern
- [secdir] Secdir review of draft-paxson-tcpm-rfc29… Catherine Meadows
- [secdir] Fwd: Secdir review of draft-paxson-tcpm-… Catherine Meadows
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-paxson-tcpm-r… Catherine Meadows
- Re: [secdir] Fwd: Secdir review of draft-paxson-t… Vern Paxson
- Re: [secdir] Fwd: Secdir review of draft-paxson-t… Mark Allman
- Re: [secdir] Fwd: Secdir review of draft-paxson-t… Vern Paxson