Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy-09
Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> Fri, 08 April 2022 16:49 UTC
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Date: Fri, 08 Apr 2022 18:49:26 +0200
From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
To: Mališa Vučinić <malisa.vucinic@inria.fr>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org, anima@ietf.org, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy.all@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy-09
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Malisa, Thanks a lot for the review. Just quick feedback on one of your points On Fri, Apr 08, 2022 at 06:23:38AM -0700, Mališa Vučinić via Datatracker wrote: > Interoperability-wise, the operation of a Stateful Join Proxy does not seem to > necessitate a standardization effort as the processing is contained on a single > network node. I disagree with this assessment. The stateful join proxy is a new element establishing a distributed machinery between three components, the pledge, the proxy and the registrar, which requires interoperability between the three. > The Registrar processes the packet from the Join Proxy as any > other packet. The fact that the DTLS state machinery of registrar and pledge do not have to change over a proxy-free operation is the result of the miticulous, packet by packet forwarding specified in 5.1. Rather a proof of the opposite of what you claim. For example: i can easily see how i could build a proxy that would break the connection by working differently. > The language that describes the operation of a Stateful Join > Proxy in Section 5.1 is informational and describes the process rather than the > protocol. It describes packet forwarding based on flow lookup, network header rewrite/recreate and delivery to new destination. If that isn't a standard demanding protocol operation, then we should have prohibited single-router-hop rfc791 networks, bcause this is already sso much more interoperable machinery than what is described in that rfc. Btw: Nobody says you can't build a multi-proxy-hop-network, its just not the desire of this spec to standardize it. Cheers Toerless > Stateless Join Proxy specification in Section 5.3 defines the message format > that the Registrar and the Join Proxy agree on, which is necessary from the > interoperability point of view. The message is split into Header and Content > parts, where Header is opaque to the Registrar and just returned verbatim to > the Join Proxy. In that sense, I don’t understand the need to specify the inner > structure of the Header part. I believe this will only introduce > interoperability issues with future version of the specification. In the last > paragraph in Section 5.3, you argue that if any (new) field is not recognized > by the Registrar, it should be ignored. But then, the protocol simply won’t be > backwards compatible because Stateless Join Proxy will have expected the > Registrar to echo the new fields. Why complicate this and not leave the whole > “Header” struct as an opaque byte string that is just echoed by the Registrar? > > Security-wise, document is incomplete. Without protection of the Header field, > an on-path attacker can easily alter the return address of the pledge to DoS > it. This is all discussed in RFC8974 and RFC9031 so I don’t understand why none > of those concerns are addressed, given the similarity of the topic. Security > considerations or Figure 5 do not elaborate on DoS considerations of either > approach. > > In general, I think that the document would use an editorial pass as there seem > to be many small inconsistencies. For example, Security Considerations talk > about a “CBOR map” while the normative message structure uses CBOR arrays. > -- --- tte@cs.fau.de
- [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-an… Mališa Vučinić via Datatracker
- Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-iet… Toerless Eckert
- Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-iet… Mališa Vučinić
- Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-iet… Peter van der Stok