[secdir] Secdir early review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-srv6-egress-protection-16

[Phillip Hallam-Baker via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Reviewer: Phillip Hallam-Baker
Review result: Has Issues

I have reviewed this document and in general, it seems ready. While it does
raise serious security concerns, it is not clear that these are new to this
proposal or that this proposal gives more leverage to an attacker.

Specifically, the draft stipulates that 'the area is in a single administrative
domain' the security considerations describes one set of attacks arising from
customers served by the domain. However, this set of attacks may be broader
than described. Consider for instance the case where there are two domains A
and B that provide transit for ISP C. An attacker that wants to ensure C is
serviced exclusively by B might perform a denial of service attack on A so as
to increase the cost of that route so as to achieve that goal.

A real world attack that has been seen in the past is country X preparing for
an invasion of country Y, performing BGP level attacks to effectively reroute
Internet traffic within Y so that the government Web sites were serviced by
fake sites set up by X. These sites containing messages of the form 'don't
worry about the military exercises'.