Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-19

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Tue, 03 January 2017 16:12 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 11:12:48 -0500
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To: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf@gmx.com>
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Cc: sidr@ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles.all@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-19
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Yaron,

Thanks for the review.

> On Jan 1, 2017, at 11:26, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf@gmx.com> wrote:
> 
> Reviewer: Yaron Sheffer
> Review result: Has Nits
> 
> * 3.1.1: The serial number in RFC 6487 is still a real, unique serial
> number that uniquely identifies the certificate. Here it is used as
> something other than a serial number, which is explicitly NOT unique,
> and the CA is left to decide how to make it unique in the face of
> potentially repeating BGP IDs. If this is not a real issue (e.g.
> because duplicate IDs are rare and never within a RIR), please say
> so.

As Rob pointed out this paragraph is talking about the serial number naming attribute.  Maybe something like:

r/only two attributes/only two naming attributes
and
r/common name and serial number/common name (i.e., X520CommonName) and serial number (i.e., X520SerialNumber) 

People ought to them be able to track down the definitions.

> * 3.2: earlier we said that Basic Constraints must not be included in
> the EE cert. Now we are saying that only a particular boolean flag
> must not be honored when processing the Cert Request. What happens if
> Basic Constraints is included in the Cert Request but with other
> flags?

The CA is ultimately the one who decides what gets issued.  A good CA would know to only issue properly formatted BGPsec certificates either by ignoring the improperly requested “feature" or rejecting it outright.  Since these CAs really aren’t open CAs then the CA ought not get caught off-guard with requests.

> * 3.3: ID.sidr-rfc6485bis -> RFC 7935

drat I missed one.

> * 6: in the paragraph that discusses hash functions, please spell out
> the names of the two key identifiers, because I cannot determine what
> they are from the document.

Ack they’re the key identifiers in the cert: Subject Key Identifier and Issuer Key Identifier 

r/two key identifier extensions./two key identifier extensions (i.e., Subject Key Identifier and Issuer Key Identifier)

spt