Re: [secdir] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-6man-reserved-iids-01

Bob Hinden <bob.hinden@nokia.com> Mon, 01 December 2008 18:35 UTC

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From: Bob Hinden <bob.hinden@nokia.com>
To: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
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Cc: 6man-chairs@tools.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-6man-reserved-iids-01
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Derek,

On Nov 28, 2008, at 12:03 PM, ext Derek Atkins wrote:

> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
> these comments just like any other last call comments.
>
> While this document itself does not have any security issues (it's
> just creating a registry with IANA) it brings up some interesting
> points.  First, what methods should IANA use to "authenticate and
> authorize" entities to create or update changes to the registry?

The document says:

"future assignments from this registry are discouraged but in  
exceptional circumstances are to be made through Standards Action  
[RFC5226]."

Only the IETF through a standard action can add entries.   I suppose  
the IANA could use PGP to authenticate email from the IESG.

> But
> more importantly, what's to stop a rogue system from declaring itself
> to use one of the reserved addresses?  And what happens to the network
> as a whole if a system does this?
>

Umm, the registry is to reserve them for a particular usage, not to  
prohibit their use.  Nothing is to stop anyone from using them.  The  
propose of the document and registry it creates is to reduce the  
chance of another standard from creating a new type of IID that  
conflicts with these.

The general form of attack you are describing is one of creating  
addresses.  It's not specific to these or any other type of interface  
IDs.

Bob

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