[secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-6man-pio-pflag-09

[Benjamin Schwartz via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Reviewer: Benjamin Schwartz
Review result: Ready

Security Issues:

The security section is, if anything, too detailed, as it describes attacks
that are not meaningful to the security of the system.  I would shorten this
section.

The privacy considerations are important and are described appropriately.  It
might be worth adding a note that privacy-conscious clients should consider not
implementing this specification.

Other topics:

I was not able to see why prefix requests "MUST" be short enough for SLAAC. 
Why would a host perform SLAAC within its own exclusively allocated prefix?  If
the host is acting as a router for a network containing SLAAC clients, it can
request a larger prefix, but why is this mandatory for all hosts?