Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-dtn-tcpclv4-18

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 20 February 2020 17:33 UTC

Return-Path: <kaduk@mit.edu>
X-Original-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6875412012E for <secdir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 20 Feb 2020 09:33:13 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.199
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id UjWumCMB59td for <secdir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 20 Feb 2020 09:33:11 -0800 (PST)
Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5A2C21200FE for <secdir@ietf.org>; Thu, 20 Feb 2020 09:33:11 -0800 (PST)
Received: from kduck.mit.edu ([24.16.140.251]) (authenticated bits=56) (User authenticated as kaduk@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 01KHX5Lf015456 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 20 Feb 2020 12:33:08 -0500
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2020 09:33:05 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20200220173305.GE97652@kduck.mit.edu>
References: <158164888774.20556.7623938203569597994@ietfa.amsl.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <158164888774.20556.7623938203569597994@ietfa.amsl.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.12.1 (2019-06-15)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/V2O8eJWgh8iATuG4SJnWZcxPA7o>
Subject: Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-dtn-tcpclv4-18
X-BeenThere: secdir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <secdir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdir/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2020 17:33:13 -0000

Hi Chris,

Thanks for doing this and the initial review; that helped the document out
quite a bit!  (I did still have a couple discuss points, but they're
largely about high-level topics relating to how much policy should be
encoded in the protocol spec.)

-Ben

On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 06:54:47PM -0800, Christopher Wood via Datatracker wrote:
> Reviewer: Christopher Wood
> Review result: Has Nits
> 
> Thanks for updating this document! All of my comments from the previous review
> have been addressed. It reads much better now. I only have some minor nits to
> note below:
> 
> - Section 8.5: This section title references ciphersuite downgrade, yet the
> text refers to configured use of less-good ciphersuites. Perhaps the title
> should be, "Threat: Weak TLS Configurations"? - Section 8.6: I don't quite
> follow this section. Certainly, describing how one validates certificates is
> out of scope. However, the title suggests this is part of how one "uses"
> certificates? I might just scratch this section altogether, and instead
> reference RFC5280 where certificate-based authentication is first presented. -
> Section 8.7: I might rename this title to, "Threat: Symmetric Key Limits." -
> Section 8.10.1: I would reference opportunistic security here, as an
> unauthenticated key exchange yields similar properties.
> 
> -- 
> last-call mailing list
> last-call@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call