Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-mpls-forwarding-06

[Curtis Villamizar <[e-mail]>]

In message <[e-mail]>
Curtis Villamizar writes:
 
>  
> In message <[e-mail]>
> Stephen Kent writes:
> > 
> > Curtis,
> >  
> > Thanks for the quick reply.
> >  
> > I agree that a thorough summary of the relevant security considerations
> > from the many normative references would be a non-trivial task ;-).
> > The brief summary you assembled is excellent!
> >  
> > I am satisfied with the changes/responses.
> >  
> > Steve
>  
>  
> Steve,
>  
> If you don't mind I'd like to add a little to this.  This is the very
> last paragraph and follows the numbered list.
>  
>  OLD PROPOSED
>  
>    MPLS security including data plane security is discussed in greater
>    detail in [RFC5920] (MPLS/GMPLS Security Framework).
>  
>  NEW PROPOSED
>  
>    MPLS security including data plane security is discussed in greater
>    detail in [RFC5920] (MPLS/GMPLS Security Framework).  THe MPLS-TP
>    security framework [RFC6941] build upon this, focusing largely on
>    the MPLS-TP OAM additions and OAM channels with some attention
>    given to using network management in place of control plane setup.
>    In both security framework documents MPLS is assumed to run within
>    a "trusted zuone", defined as being where a single service provider
>    (SP) has total operational control over that part of the network.
>  
>    If control plane security and management plane security are
>    sufficiently robust, compromise of a single network element may
>    result in chaos in the data plane anywhere in the network through
>    denial of service attacks, but not a Byzantine security failure in
>    which other network elements are fully compromised.
>  
>    MPLS security, or lack of, can affect whether traffic can be
>    misrouted and lost, or intercepted, or intercepted and reinserted
>    (a man-in-the-middle attack) or spoofed.  End user applications,
>    including control plane and management plane protocols used by the
>    SP, are expected to make use of appropriate end-to-end
>    authentication and where appropriate end-to-end encryption.
>  
> I think the original, while not incorrect, was too brief.  This new
> text provides a better summary, indicating the underlying "trusted
> zuone" assumption and the lack of any meaningful data plane security
> if that underlying assumption proves invalid for any reason, but most
> likely invalid due to a breach or a physical intercept along
> transmission media.
>  
> Please let me know if this further change is an improvement or if we
> should leave it out (or change it).
>  
> Curtis


s/THe/The/
s/zuone/zone/