Re: [secdir] draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-uri-02

"Scott G. Kelly" <scott@hyperthought.com> Mon, 31 October 2011 12:17 UTC

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Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2011 05:17:41 -0700
From: "Scott G. Kelly" <scott@hyperthought.com>
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To: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
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Cc: draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-uri.all@tools.ietf.org, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-uri-02
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Hi Richard,

On 10/30/11 1:19 PM, Richard Barnes wrote:
> <trimmed...>
> Why isn't unauthorized manipulation of the policy information also listed as a risk? Actually, the second paragraph of the security considerations addresses this, ("The mechanism also needs to ensure that only authorized entities are able to acquire or alter policy."), but subsequent text seems to indicate that if the policy URI is not kept secret, there are no further protections.
> Since we're talking about access control policy here, the effect of "manipulation of the policy information" is precisely "unauthorized disclosure of the protected resource".  Does that clear thing sup?

I see your point, but manipulation of policy information could also be 
used to prevent/deny disclosure too. As I noted below, I have no 
experience with these protocols, and this may not matter, but as a 
reviewer, I think I should mention it.

>> Am I missing something here, or is secrecy of the URI really the only protection against unauthorized policy manipulation? I have to admit that I have no experience with these protocols, and it may be that this is addressed elsewhere (or truly doesn't matter), but it does feel a bit off.
>
> You're exactly right in that understanding.  The idea is that a policy URI is already controlling access control policy on something, so we didn't want to have access control policies for who can access policy URIs (turtles all the way down).  That's the reason for all the text about keeping the policy URI secret.

I didn't see any language suggesting that if one wishes to mitigate the 
resulting exposure, these URIs should probably be short-lived. Is that 
covered in one of the related docs?  Again, not sure if this matters, 
but as the boilerplate suggests, the purpose of these secdir reviews is 
to let the security ADs (who presumably have much more context) know if 
there's anything they should be aware of, so I pointed it out. Lacking 
background and protocol expertise, I don't have any strong position of 
my own on this.

--Scott