Re: [secdir] [nfsv4] Last Call: <draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc3530bis-25.txt> (Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Protocol) to Proposed Standard

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Wed, 03 April 2013 21:07 UTC

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Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2013 16:07:10 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Cc: ietf@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] [nfsv4] Last Call: <draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc3530bis-25.txt> (Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Protocol) to Proposed Standard
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On Mon, Apr 1, 2013 at 12:01 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> Section 3.2.1.1 of this document ("Kerberos V5 as a security triple") seems
> to indicate that it is mandatory for a conformant NFSv4 implementation to
> implement the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism and a few "security triples"
> (mechanism,quality of protection,service).  All of the
> mandatory-to-implement security triples use the DES-MAC-MD5 algorithm. The
> draft goes on to indicate that clients should engage in security negotiation
> (section 3.3) to determine what security to use for bulk operation, and that
> since kerberos-v5 under RPCSEC_GSS is mandatory, the negotiation will be
> performed using that security provider.  The actual mechanism resulting from
> the negotiation may be different (or may be the same), but this single-DES
> mechanism seems to be required to be used to protect the negotiation step.

Oh, well, this is just outdated text.  And indeed, the GSS-API's
notion of "qop" (quality of protection) is broken: it's used in the
wrong place (per-msg token functions).  The GSS qop brokenness is why
this text persists.

OLD:
   1 == number of pseudo flavor
   2 == name of pseudo flavor
   3 == mechanism's OID
   4 == mechanism's algorithm(s)
   5 == RPCSEC_GSS service

   1      2     3                    4             5
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   390003 krb5  1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 DES MAC MD5   rpc_gss_svc_none
   390004 krb5i 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 DES MAC MD5   rpc_gss_svc_integrity
   390005 krb5p 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 DES MAC MD5   rpc_gss_svc_privacy
                                     for integrity,
                                     and 56 bit DES
                                     for privacy.

NEW:
   1 == number of pseudo flavor
   2 == name of pseudo flavor
   3 == mechanism's OID
   4 == qop
   5 == RPCSEC_GSS service

   1      2     3                    4             5
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   390003 krb5  1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 0   rpc_gss_svc_none
   390004 krb5i 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 0   rpc_gss_svc_integrity
   390005 krb5p 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 0   rpc_gss_svc_privacy

KITTEN WG should undertake an extension to replace the broken qop concept.

Nico
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