[secdir] secdir review of draft-korhonen-mip4-service-07

This document seems largely parallel to RFC 5149.  (Which,
incidentally, does not appear to have come up for secdir review, at
least according to my mail archives.)

The Security Considerations section appears to adequately describe
considerations for the confidentiality protection for the service
identifier.

There may be denial of service vulnerabilities due to the requirements
that the parties terminate an existing binding upon experiencing an
authorization failure of a registration attempt that requests a change
of service selection.  An attacker capable of forging a registration
request selecting a service for which the purported user lacks
authorization could maliciously terminate an existing binding.

If the request is authenticated (with a sufficiently strong mechanism)
prior to the processing of the service selection, this is not a
problem.  I did not extensively research whether any current IPv4
Mobility authentication mechanisms are sufficiently strong to thwart
this sort of attack, though I expect that at least some of the
mechanisms are sufficiently strong.

It would be nice to have some additional text emphasizing that the
sort of authorization process that may result in the home agent's
termination of the binding should only occur after the home agent
successfully authenticates the content of the request.  I think it is
not a strong requirement to include such text, because a creator of a
quality implementation could probably infer the need for this behavior
from existing text in the document.
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