Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-ospf-auth-trailer-ospfv3-08

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Sat, 29 October 2011 21:48 UTC

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2011 22:48:17 +0100
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Cc: "Bhatia, Manav (Manav)" <manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, "draft-ietf-ospf-auth-trailer-ospfv3.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ospf-auth-trailer-ospfv3.all@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-ospf-auth-trailer-ospfv3-08
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+1 to what Sam said,
S

On 29 Oct 2011, at 20:42, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:

> Hi.  The rationale behind the IANA registry is to avoid related protocol
> attacks.  The intent is to have a registry for protocols (there are a
> number in the routing area) that use similar layouts for authentication
> information to avoid related protocol attacks when the same key is used
> cross-protocol.el :So, anything sufficiently similar to this needs to be
> registered.  I think the registry is the result of a fairly tight
> compromise already and I would not recommend re-opening that discussion.
> I'd be delighted if you want to propose better names for the registry or
> the initial registration; I suspect we're not tied to those.
> 
> I do not support removing the key-strength indication.  Realistically I
> think this application probably does require at least 64-bits of
> security (assuming there are no hash collision issues, which would
> double the security requirement). I don't actively support reducing the
> key strength requirement below 128-bits, but I'm not opposed if someone
> really wants to do that. Note that a 16-character password does not meet
> the current requirement: passwords are typically not random drown from
> the set of all binary values of a given size.