[secdir] secdir review of kivinen-ipsecme-secure-password-framework-01
David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com> Tue, 23 August 2011 14:51 UTC
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From: David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>
To: secdir@ietf.org, draft-kivinen-ipsecme-secure-password-framework.all@tools.ietf.org
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Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 07:52:17 -0700
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Cc: "iesg@ietf.org IESG" <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: [secdir] secdir review of kivinen-ipsecme-secure-password-framework-01
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The intended status of this document is Informational, but in some sense it is performing actions with implications for standards. It implies, but does not state, that IANA should not allocate the "IKEv2 Authentication Method" numbers requested by three experimental drafts ([1], [2], [3]). The motivation for this draft is that "each of ([1], [2], [3]) used different method to negotiate" the use of the method, but it does not clarify where the difficulty arises - each of those three documents defines its own IKEv2 Authentication Method. The Security Considerations section punts to [1], [2], and [3], but this document would be more useful if it provided a comparison of the existing methods. There are some signficiant differences (for instance, [2] has special considerations for RFC5282, but [1] and [3] do not), and the absence of a securty analysis puts a burden on the user of the framework. The document has many nits, and needs an editorial pass. Some suggested changes below: Abstract: "This document specifies a common way so those methods can agree on which method is to be used in current connection." -> "This document specifies a way to agree on which method is to be used in current connection. " Introduction: "As each of those documents used different method to negotiate the use of the method ..." -> "As each of those documents used a different technique to negotiate the use of the method ..." I suggest removing "This document does not create new protocol or even define a protocol which could be used to do anything." Section 2. "The proposed negotiation exchange would be:" -> "The secure password negotiation exchange is:" IANA Considerations: "TBD Secure Password Authentication Method" -> " TBD Generic Secure Password Authentication Method" notes: [1] harkins-ipsecme-spsk-auth [2] kuegler-ipsecme-pace-ikev2 [3] shin-augmented-pake
- [secdir] secdir review of kivinen-ipsecme-secure-… David McGrew
- [secdir] secdir review of kivinen-ipsecme-secure-… Tero Kivinen