Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-pcp-proxy-08

[<[e-mail]>]

Dear Samuel,

Many thanks for the review. 

FWIW, PCP auth is not cited in this document because we followed the same approach as in RFC6887 and RFC6970. 

Blocking on draft-ietf-pcp-authentication is not justified IMHO because the proxy can be enabled with ACLs enabled at the client, server and the network in between. 

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Samuel Weiler [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Envoyé : lundi 6 juillet 2015 02:54
> À : [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Objet : secdir review of draft-ietf-pcp-proxy-08
> 
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
> these comments just like any other last call comments.
> 
> Summary: document is ready for publication (with mild reservation).
> 
> My thanks to the document editors for producing a readable document.
> 
> Mild reservation: when I look at the use cases for PCP Proxy in this
> document (e.g. a consumer router doing NAT, connected to hotel NAT,
> connected to carrier NAT), it's hard to imagine that operational
> environment often fitting within the description of PCP's "simple
> threat model" (RFC6887, section 18.1).  And once you reject the
> simplifying assumptions in that "simple threat model", RFC6877 says
> PCP needs a security mechanism (section 18.2 of RFC6877).  Maybe this
> document should explicity reinforce that need, perhaps citing and
> blocking on draft-ietf-pcp-authentication?