Re: [secdir] secdir review odraft-ietf-netext-wifi-epc-eap-attributes

"Leif Johansson" <leifj@sunet.se> Wed, 09 July 2014 05:32 UTC

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From: "Leif Johansson" <leifj@sunet.se>
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Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2014 07:32:39 +0200
References: <53BA57E3.8080300@sunet.se> <CFE03243.1594%rajeev.koodli@intel.com> <53BBF2A5.10506@sunet.se> <CFE160D4.1613%rajeev.koodli@intel.com> <298C55D6-7F96-4BB5-9313-BA02A2B4D2F2@cisco.com> <53BC2779.70506@sunet.se> <CFE1BBCA.166F%rajeev.koodli@intel.com> <3C10F572-C486-4D3D-8BFF-AB5507831B24@cisco.com>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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Cc: "Koodli, Rajeev" <rajeev.koodli@intel.com>, "draft-ietf-netext-wifi-epc-eap-attributes.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-netext-wifi-epc-eap-attributes.all@tools.ietf.org>, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review odraft-ietf-netext-wifi-epc-eap-attributes
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> 9 jul 2014 kl. 06:48 skrev "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>;:
> 
> 
>> On Jul 8, 2014, at 3:20 PM, Koodli, Rajeev <rajeev.koodli@intel.com>; wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> RFC 4187:
>> 
>> "8.2 Protocol Extensibility
>> 
>>  EAP-AKA can be extended by specifying new attribute types.  If
>>  skippable attributes are used, it is possible to extend the protocol
>>  without breaking old implementations.  As specified in Section 10.13,
>>  if new attributes are specified for EAP-Request/AKA-Identity or
>>  EAP-Response/AKA-Identity, then the AT_CHECKCODE MUST be used to
>>  integrity protect the new attributes.²
> 
> [Joe]  Makes sense.  Although it is redundant with RFC4187, It might be worth mentioning in the security considerations section that AT_CHECKCODE protects the attributes in the EAP/AKA-Identity messages once it has be verified by a valid AT_MAC.   This would help clarify that the attributes are protected and at what point they are authenticated.  It might also help remind implementers that they need to implement AT_CHECKCODE.  

agree!

> 
>> 
>> So, this applies for the attribute in question.
>> 
>> -Rajeev
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On 7/8/14, 10:16 AM, "Leif Johansson" <leifj@sunet.se>; wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> [Joe] Is the attribute in question protected by AT_MAC?  If not, its
>>>> possible that it could be modified in transit.
>>> 
>>> yeah what Joe said
>