[Secdispatch] Re: Y2K29 (was Re: DISPATCH/SECDISPATCH - Call for topics for Vienna)

David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Mon, 08 June 2026 22:04 UTC

Return-Path: <davidben@google.com>
X-Original-To: secdispatch@mail2.ietf.org
Delivered-To: secdispatch@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B2389FDAFB1A for <secdispatch@mail2.ietf.org>; Mon, 8 Jun 2026 15:04:49 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=ietf.org; s=ietf1; t=1780956289; bh=zhtUB7n9DG3ypqKYGQ9n+7RwXHL9X9wLfkm8u997uJs=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To:Cc; b=NCrGn4ww4SG3cyDhOb41skWdWyfDquf14AAWXRMYEi4KgKikM152nKiCuudhq/6Ie YYrQhI9lCbB+Eh0fpSxUXGZNeSsaYciDkKD3tz6uUyB5h53AZBxkeYaIa4rxj7Qopi brWFSVgRQ6F2FMFvkFW29vKZOHNuagU7wRZoYWVk=
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at ietf.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -9.499
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.499 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, USER_IN_DEF_SPF_WL=-7.5] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org
Received: from mail2.ietf.org ([166.84.6.31]) by localhost (mail2.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tO6FF-FlMrCG for <secdispatch@mail2.ietf.org>; Mon, 8 Jun 2026 15:04:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ej1-x62a.google.com (mail-ej1-x62a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62a]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 76114FDAFB05 for <secdispatch@ietf.org>; Mon, 8 Jun 2026 15:04:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ej1-x62a.google.com with SMTP id a640c23a62f3a-bf1141c26ecso610803566b.0 for <secdispatch@ietf.org>; Mon, 08 Jun 2026 15:04:47 -0700 (PDT)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1780956280; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20240605; b=D+5ewAZahKSjqqLd3b2xrC2N8EvECzsGUhM1JMY1Js67G8JfpKfWSWiEitOXHzRqzq K29wCmmDm3tBmBvD2a5Gvww6aActXoe6gAs87M8ldmNQaCx6AGTvgisfD9bGIeayKJq2 eXpaj62Y5esLpH+Lxz6uX7NGrgoLk558oHjnucUqimpPo0RjZC5A9p+kdL9RQrtd1yUE loF+pFjTey4LmiNZJXLO+dPAdAycRCccjsIWH+4Pj0EurBFTtdA9ZHWc0qdvEbp847mB oRlHyrWWn5iP0T6nNz2ONom5JV5WdtSIuxjziYE6OGbs1SfQRQ/SGbgbujm1K28xK9Q9 U9oA==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20240605; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:dkim-signature; bh=qbeTGDaA73dPjc7nh863+YKrCgHHFDgP35MA9DKY5c8=; fh=pqmtECh+rgWzFEYnuLFJO9FVG0QdA+sN35MAzfrhsBI=; b=l25eYhE7eOLMHVVE5P3LM0ElAhSOYvXPztLj7BNm7tIYgokT7P2i3noeIl/81NXpEs S/Ts/AzqqZ6t2XSl9lLyp0z4Ttq6dfvrFm4jvN9d6USG9E4+d/mMBiM6YFI9y5LYW99J UT4/Lw7GhlP0qDH8kKBzzefD+a5b2/DPJnKsxzk1hVO2c5X5pnQdVUb1jKaafgaJ4uno JTfBLLYpeJmKtzWS0+Hcse3QzxJXPMp4ZDrL/tWYORXfxiN2uiiJrArdZy6wbMAblA9g 0bzlo0vuqEsj9Rlhk3IoORPuxoaea/Z0IxkMfuX3F+P55JKpdTliZ+bdsdKKX8oieeR0 LdcQ==; darn=ietf.org
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; arc=none
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; t=1780956280; x=1781561080; darn=ietf.org; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=qbeTGDaA73dPjc7nh863+YKrCgHHFDgP35MA9DKY5c8=; b=bzI63RuAAXYN/+cLGT7QlTNbYAwQ6WvhCiJVe7Su2GFVcJJlqa4HTuGo5el5Ea9FKd Y5IUvNVvjbfGNZj+YTrZn87sUdNLDzcjhfuIypygQcNYORt3X2Be1IDy0WtHIGKFhOJV /hkFgGTL80DiquWQRcwFq24ipDKr3XyfMa8Uw=
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20251104; t=1780956280; x=1781561080; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-gg:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=qbeTGDaA73dPjc7nh863+YKrCgHHFDgP35MA9DKY5c8=; b=iW4qTLLJLjp3XUxS0dtykymqvX7vExva0cCWddgQXdFhn/GtUivZPeOrNcpjPn+/bU ePQlUpcCK+R0CJgP2o+XHY8XiTqX5Dfn2IrCbjUTzDVe5CGueCzTdOV2+UOYoULckbko K6RYj7N6ZoQiRYyYL9RGOcLaK8SpxNVZxTpYSVHsUAZmOdx/rwhJESzqcvfYfq8Rssg4 IXAdKxwPvpVYvnrR349KNZNCg7fjJ054YbCblHSrG0SgWH3sgHj4aAHsYMtADLuRdIAR EyDpFtzEovGDBuUPiU+rgf8N54aFyp+1vKwk46kiod9ZWtlz66RLWJ7p9+lweRTcMF+J YRWQ==
X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AFNElJ+VAb1vjnzzowFONDrSHwd9W7i3zfESry0v4XQY4fz3IL4a7nAD3XT+RgRL9O1FXiHDx5uWaHBbuEvv9A==@ietf.org
X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YyBAcIvW2G3fcFzYj0eWIWS7zGQcGHWRnkT3sJ7SSIn7qvLS7hQ Fbc9ESmcr+Lww517tdJ4x0qrB6heABXOKH4fLlwqjiv2/zPMz3FsvfcdPvVQ1pjJuLgmd66AXBY OuqCyp+g7i/sDpiSKJLdmhIHOW11o1WeG/v/fOuQ=
X-Gm-Gg: Acq92OF+iDJEld5MlOubOfxIPdZytGu1xs7o9DFA7v8Pq0sLy0E8ZKwiedVGH9d29fk xZQSVh9WVmBSAqpyb83WoJnhLFufjmqh1S/Dqysr6bq1aYjNlW/jWthKSG3hDNOeSq4x+j+8//g P/zRMSfPDDXPiK/wc+rvGW7TMmUhVIb4YSyXhUw4v1zExpsO1BvbGpFUN/F4E+gwoSZ3bhghjyg Seu0Vpdho8smP1SdQG90Y7r0WN+TktcvXWLqCJEwFoMCBI72F4ybJvTBtAfOQxpeOrUmmlqki27 aK8YFQ9k8iccZEFabVA06i2XBn74mWHke1tKqOz7N5Kx3xlm
X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:c518:b0:bed:eb8b:d404 with SMTP id a640c23a62f3a-bf370866e4cmr891131366b.16.1780956279632; Mon, 08 Jun 2026 15:04:39 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CADNypP_zNn_AQKCxodeStDPnJvVqNyXqzEZhUXGr8Otgr7xMYA@mail.gmail.com> <aiOZvQO9xA958azm@ubby> <aiT1rDQF9rT3oajf@ubby> <5AC11ABD-CF83-4F68-A53E-4304E4DF803A@proper.com> <CABcZeBPccub39EJqpBh7BGrVcg5X5sN5n3d=AsPEozKkVM_Ztw@mail.gmail.com> <CAF8qwaB7WpO49_dc9KX2TbQ__gzucXX1OdvpHYpdeFp+6yOi=Q@mail.gmail.com> <aicx928q9ynDcMeK@ubby>
In-Reply-To: <aicx928q9ynDcMeK@ubby>
From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2026 18:04:20 -0400
X-Gm-Features: AVVi8Cfef_03ETVKA0S08W8ioqyyjY26a1UpEEZYQ4EhH4Ue48ZS2z1RTAv5Vkk
Message-ID: <CAF8qwaDVxiHazTtoO6x8jXz-nKPaxLucy=Fx9jaSO2DqKjXrpQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000694b770653c5326e"
Message-ID-Hash: OSBW7RM2ALXIKSAAGZPWPFRGIRJRLBAY
X-Message-ID-Hash: OSBW7RM2ALXIKSAAGZPWPFRGIRJRLBAY
X-MailFrom: davidben@google.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-secdispatch.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Paul Hoffman <phoffman@proper.com>, dispatch@ietf.org, secdispatch <secdispatch@ietf.org>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [Secdispatch] Re: Y2K29 (was Re: DISPATCH/SECDISPATCH - Call for topics for Vienna)
List-Id: Security Dispatch <secdispatch.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/T-MEMuJ8JFF9VmeWscbDM2oJ1Rw>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdispatch>
List-Help: <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:secdispatch-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:secdispatch-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:secdispatch-leave@ietf.org>

On Mon, Jun 8, 2026 at 5:19 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 08, 2026 at 04:55:02PM -0400, David Benjamin wrote:
> > On Sun, Jun 7, 2026 at 3:46 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> > > As I understand it, the situation is as follows:
> > >
> > > [...]
> >
> > >From the server side, there are *definitely* no plans to stop offering
> > classical certificates to existing clients. That's not necessary for a
> > secure post-quantum transition, nor is it remotely practical.
>
> What about trust anchors?
>

When you say trust anchors, I assume you mean what the client trusts? To
get to the point that post-quantum authentication means anything at all,
it's indeed necessary for clients to stop accepting classical trust
anchors, so
https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/post-quantum-auth-roadmap/
talks about how to get there.

That said, if a browser were to only accept certificates chaining to a
post-quantum trust anchor, that would have pretty severe compatibility
impacts when talking to HTTPS servers that don't have such certificates! So
the document talks both about:
- An HSTS-like mechanism to try to apply it only to sites that opt-in.
This, however, has a laundry list of downsides discussed there. (See Stage
2.)
- How to use our existing automation points to get PQ-*incapable* servers
to a point where they're *at least* able to authenticate their classical
key with a PQ anchor, so that the PQ-*capable* servers get downgrade
protection. (See Stage 3.)

(Please see that URL for details. I don't want to belabor the dispatch list
with a heavy design discussion.)

Of course, throughout all that you have to also expect the ecosystem to
contain PQ-incapable clients, so all these server states need to still be
able to serve older clients. It is not practical[0] to expect every client
to migrate to PQC at the same time as every other client. Broadly, any kind
of PKI-level transition means the servers have to be able to configure
multiple certificates, sending the right one to each client.

Once we get there, these kinds of PKI transitions are much simpler, because
you can still serve older non-PQC clients without impacting the PQC
clients. It also means that just because one set of clients are targeting
one timeline, doesn't mean every other client needs to match that timeline.

[0] Indeed the common refrain throughout the Internet has been that old
stuff lasts longer than you think.


> > >From the client side, you can see a bit about how we're thinking about
> the
> > transition at
> >
> https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/post-quantum-auth-roadmap/
> .
>
> What about KSATs and GSATs?
>

You may need to expand those acronyms for me. I'm not familiar with them.
That document is talking about Web clients and Web servers authenticated
via the Web PKI. (Of course, all these parties interact with increasingly
non-Web things, but there the practical answer is largely to orthogonalize,
and enable things to transition at their own rate. Hence the focus on
making sure there's a story for old/new clients talking to old/new servers.)


> What do you think of specifying an IPC protocol not unlike the Google
> metadata service?  Such a service would generally offload cacheable
> things from in-app TLS and IAM codebases to the service:
>
>  - requesting PSKs (if we go that route)
>  - validating certificates (especially MCT ones)
>  - requesting tokens (think GSATs)
>

Google metadata service? Is MCT a typo for MTC (Merkle Tree Certificates)?
Are you talking about how MTC relying parties pick up optional information
about "landmarks" to validate the smaller certificates?

If so, this may stem from a misunderstanding. MTC does *not* require that
relying parties have out-of-band data. Standalone MTC certificates are
analogous to regular X.509 certificates, all the way down to the X.509
encoding. It's "just" a few extra hash operations (an inclusion proof) in
the signature verification operation. If you were able to ship new code to
validate straight ML-DSA signatures, you should be able to ship new code to
validate these funny ones. (The devil's in the details, which is why we
have a PLANTS WG. But that's the broad strokes.)

Now, one[1] reason for these extra hash operations is to enable a second
form of certificate ("landmark-relative certificates"). *These* funny
signatures *do* need out-of-band data. However, they are *optional*.
Servers are expected to always have the standalone certificate configured,
and then use TLS certificate negotiation to only send the landmark-relative
ones to clients with up-to-date state. If your client's state is stale, or
if it doesn't support this state at all, it just gets the standalone ones.

Whether it makes sense to standardize that service, I don't know. To
usefully standardize it, I think you have to have a class of applications
that would be interested in using a common protocol. That's not how such
things look today. Today this sort of thing is part of a very
application-specific update paths. That's not to say it wouldn't be useful
for the future. My intuition is we're more likely to see this settle as OS
and platform services[2] that expose data out of their still
platform-dependent update streams, but maybe my intuition is wrong?

But the high-order bit we're already, due to other constraints, designing
systems to not require this stuff. So, whether or not it's *useful* to
build these supporting protocols, it doesn't need to be a *panic* around
2029.

Regarding generalizing between PSKs and MTC metadata, *that* I would
caution against. PSK distribution has very, *very* different requirements
from MTC metadata. MTC metadata is client-independent, public, verifiable
data. You could get it from anywhere. A PSK is the polar opposite. Go too
far down this road and you've probably re-designed Kerberos. ;-)

[1] Not the only reason. It also structurally fixes a swath of pain points
around Certificate Transparency. See PLANTS for details on all that.
There's a bunch of recordings and slides from the BoF.
[2] E.g. https://discourse.ubuntu.com/t/an-update-on-upki/77063

> For something less abstract, is there a particular combination of client
> > and server that sparked this concern?
>
> For me it was a conference report I saw by a colleague.
>

Mm. That's not a whole lot to go on. ;-)

David