[Secdispatch] Requesting agenda time for draft-vaughn-tlstm-update

Kenneth Vaughn <kvaughn@trevilon.com> Mon, 28 June 2021 02:30 UTC

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From: Kenneth Vaughn <kvaughn@trevilon.com>
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Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2021 21:30:48 -0500
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Subject: [Secdispatch] Requesting agenda time for draft-vaughn-tlstm-update
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I would like to present https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vaughn-tlstm-update-01/, a new version of the proposed update of RFC 6353 (TLSTM). Based on feedback from this group, and the recent IETF decision to finalize DTLS, the ITS community decided to keep support for DTLS in the update. The result of that decision was to reverse a number of changes in the text and it made more sense to write the proposed new version 01 as an update to RFC 6353 rather than a replacement of RFC 6353. The result is a shorter document where the changes are more evident.
I would like to request 10-15 minutes at IETF meeting of the Security Dispatch group to discuss the possibility of launching an effort to continue the development of this document as an official IETF document.
Regards,
Ken Vaughn

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