[Secdispatch] Re: Dispatch guidance requested: Permit Receipts for permit-before-commit authorization

Scott Lee <scott@meridianverity.com> Mon, 08 June 2026 15:28 UTC

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Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2026 15:26:57 +0000
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
From: Scott Lee <scott@meridianverity.com>
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Subject: [Secdispatch] Re: Dispatch guidance requested: Permit Receipts for permit-before-commit authorization
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Hi Rich, SECDISPATCH,

Thanks for the question.

To be precise and not overstate support: at this stage, no party outside me / Meridian Verity Group has made a public commitment to co-author, implement, adopt, or advance this work in the IETF. I have had informal exploratory conversations with potential reviewers and adjacent stakeholders, but I do not want to characterize private or preliminary interest as IETF support unless those people or organizations choose to speak for themselves publicly.

I am bringing this to SECDISPATCH because I believe the underlying security problem is broader than any one organization. As AI agents and automated workloads become able to mutate accounts, trigger workflows, invoke privileged APIs, release data, change infrastructure, and initiate payment-adjacent actions, relying systems may need a clearer way to verify the exact external effect before it is committed.

My goal is not to advance a company-specific mechanism or ask the IETF to bless an implementation. I am trying to determine whether the community sees value in a narrow, vendor-neutral, independently reviewable security primitive around permit-before-commit decisions for protected external effects.

To make the discussion concrete, I published the public evaluation companion. It is synthetic and non-production. It gives reviewers runnable examples and negative vectors for deterministic canonicalization, action-digest binding, policy-epoch checks, status and recency checks, anti-replay behavior, and fail-closed denial before a protected effect is committed.

The honest answer is: there is not yet demonstrated external implementation or co-author commitment. I am using the draft and runnable companion to solicit that interest openly and to give the community something specific to evaluate.

If the right next step is to keep this as an individual effort while building public review and implementer interest, I am comfortable with that. I would rather get the scope and security model right in the open than overstate support or push too broad a proposal too early.

Best,

Scott Lee
Founder & Chief Architect
Meridian Verity Group
meridianverity.com | 917-868-2947

On Monday, June 8th, 2026 at 10:56 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> What other parties, other than you and your organization, have expressed an interest in working on this?