draft-igoe-secsh-x509v3-06.txt
Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu> Mon, 11 October 2010 14:03 UTC
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Date: Mon, 11 Oct 2010 10:04:09 -0400
From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu>
To: turners@ieca.com
cc: jhutz@cmu.edu, draft-igoe-secsh-x509v3.all@tools.ietf.org, ietf-ssh@netbsd.org, iesg-secretary@ietf.org
Subject: draft-igoe-secsh-x509v3-06.txt
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This is a request for the IESG to approve publication of "X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication", draft-igoe-secsh-x509v3-06.txt, as a Proposed Standard. This document is an individual submission to the IESG. (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the document and, in particular, does he or she believe this version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication? The Document Shepherd for this document is Jeffrey Hutzelman, <jhutz@cmu.edu>. I have reviewed this document, and I believe it is ready for IETF-wide review and publication as a Proposed Standard. (1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key members of the interested community and others? Does the Document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? While the SECSH working group concluded in 2006, its mailing list remains an active forum for SSH implementation developers and other interested parties. This draft has been discussed in that forum and has evolved as a part of that discussion. I am satisfied that it has received sufficient review. (1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document needs more review from a particular or broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with AAA, internationalization or XML? I don't believe any particular additional review is needed. (1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the interested community has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. I have no concerns or issues with this document. (1.e) How solid is the consensus of the interested community behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the interested community as a whole understand and agree with it? There seems to be a solid consensus among those who have been active in the discussions of this document. There has long been interest in the SSH community in supporting X.509 certificates within the SSH protocol; in fact, such work was being pursued in the SECSH working group prior to its conclusion (see draft-ietf-secsh-x509-03.txt). While not everyone active on the mailing list has participated in discussions of the present document, there seems to be a solid consensus to move forward among those who have. Participants who have been active in this discussion include several SSH implementors and one of the co-authors of the previously mentioned document. (1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is entered into the ID Tracker.) I am not aware of any such threats or indications of discontent. (1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the document satisfies all ID nits? (See http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB Doctor, media type and URI type reviews? This document satisfies the idnits tool and all of the requirements called out in ID-Checklist.html. No additional formal review criteria apply. (1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and informative? Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the strategy for their completion? Are there normative references that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967]. References in this document are appropriately split. There is a downward reference to RFC3447, an Informational document which is a republication of PKCS#1 v2.1. (1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA consideration section exists and is consistent with the body of the document? If the document specifies protocol extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If the document creates a new registry, does it define the proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation procedure for future registrations? Does it suggested a reasonable name for the new registry? See [I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis]. If the document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation? The IANA considerations section is correct and consistent with the body of the document. This document registers three SSH public key algorithm names and one family of SSH public key algorith names; it does not create any new registries. (1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the document that are written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in an automated checker? This document contains no sections written in formal machine-readable languages. It does define protocol messages in the form traditionally used for the SSH protocol and its extensions, including use of data types taken from section 5 of RFC4251; these are used correctly. (1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Writeup? Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary X.509 public key certificates use a signature by a trusted certification authority to bind a given public key to a given digital identity. This document specifies how to use X.509 version 3 public key certificates in public key algorithms in the Secure Shell protocol. Working Group Summary When the Secure Shell working group concluded in 2006, active work on defining use of X.509 certificates in the SSH protocol was left uncompleted. However, there was and continues to be community interest in extending the SSH protocol to provide this functionality. Further, although the working group concluded, its mailing list remains active as a forum for discussion among SSH protocol implementors and other interested parties. This document was discussed extensively on that list, and seems to represent the consensus of participants in that discussion. Document Quality A number of SSH implementors have been active in reviewing and discussing this extension. While no one has explicitly said whether they intend to implement, it seems likely that several will do so.
- draft-igoe-secsh-x509v3-06.txt Jeffrey Hutzelman