Re: [sfc] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-farrel-sfc-convent-05: (with COMMENT)

["Adrian Farrel" <[e-mail]>]

Hey Eric,

Thanks for this comment.

>    The need to protect the metadata is not modified by this document and
>    forms part of the NSH definition found in [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh].
> Nit: I wouldn't limit this to encryption. If you care about integrity/data
> origin authentication, then encryption may not supply that,

If I'm reading you right, you're observing that the mechanism described in the
document might allow an imposter to introduce metadata.

That's sounds like a real problem and we should do something like:

OLD
   The mechanism described in this document might possibly be used to
   introduce packets into the SFC overlay network.  Therefore measures
   SHOULD be taken to ensure authorization of sources of such packets,
   and tunneling of such packets into the network SHOULD be prevented.
   The amount of packets with "Next Protocol" set to "None" on an SFP
   SHOULD be rate limited at each point on the SFP to provide additional
   security.
NEW
   The mechanism described in this document might be used to introduce
   packets into the SFC overlay network and might be used to
   illegitimately introduce false metadata to the nodes on an SFC. 
   Therefore measures SHOULD be taken to ensure authorization of sources
   of such packets, and tunneling of such packets into the network
   SHOULD be prevented. 
   
   The amount of packets with "Next Protocol" set to "None" on an SFP
   SHOULD be rate limited at each point on the SFP to provide additional
   network security.
END

Does that do it?

Cheers,
Adrian