Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approaches,or choose one?
<ao.ting@zte.com.cn> Fri, 21 December 2018 02:32 UTC
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Subject: Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approaches,or choose one?
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I agree with Joel. Since SSSS already has mechanism to provide ordered verification requirment, only this one approach is enough. Regards. 敖婷 Ting Ao 原始邮件 发件人:JoelM.Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com> 收件人:Frank Brockners (fbrockne) <fbrockne@cisco.com>;sfc@ietf.org <sfc@ietf.org>; 日 期 :2018年12月17日 04:53 主 题 :Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approaches,or choose one? <no hats> Personally, the argument for just using SSSS, given that it now can provide ordered verification, seems quite persuasive to me. Yours, Joel <hat floating back on slowly> On 12/15/18 3:19 PM, Frank Brockners (fbrockne) wrote: > During the SFC WG at IETF 103 in Bangkok we raised the question, whether > we could simplify the draft and choose a single algorithm for > proof-of-transit only (see also > https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/minutes-103-sfc-01). > Given that we could not come to a conclusion, we decided to take the > discussion to the list. > > Background: > > draft-ietf-sfc-proof-of-transit-01 describes two different approaches: > “nested encryption” and “Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (SSSS)”... We > documented both approaches in the initial version of the draft, because > the two approaches had different qualities: While SSSS was > computationally cheaper (each node only needs to perform two additions, > a multiplication and a modulo-division), nested-encryption allowed to > verify that packets traversed a set of nodes in a particular order > (“ordered POT - OPOT”) – something that the SSSS-approach in the initial > version of the draft did not offer. With the changes discussed in IETF > 102 and now documented in draft-ietf-sfc-proof-of-transit-01, both > approaches offer order preservation. > > In summary, we can now observe the following qualities of the two > approaches: > > * SSSS: Allows verification that a given set of nodes has been > traversed in a specific order (POT and OPOT). SSSS without order > preservation requires 2 additions, 1 multiplication, 1 division per > node participating in POT. Order preservation on top of that > requires an additional XOR (or similar). > * Nested-encryption: Allows verification that a given set of nodes has > been traversed in a specific order (POT and OPOT). The computational > effort of nested encryption depends on the crypto algorithm chosen > and typically higher than SSSS, i.e.. it requires/benefits from > hardware with specific capabilities (e.g. AES-NI). > > Question: > > Given that both approaches both solve the problem of POT and ordered > POT, should we consider simplifying the draft and describe only a single > approach? If so, which approach should we choose? > > I.e. when taking the computational effort into account and the fact that > options increase the burden for any implementor, we could decide to only > describe the SSSS approach in the draft. > > Thoughts? Opinions? > > Many thanks, Frank > > > > _______________________________________________ > sfc mailing list > sfc@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc > _______________________________________________ sfc mailing list sfc@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Diego R. Lopez
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Diego R. Lopez
- [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approa… Frank Brockners (fbrockne)
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Joel M. Halpern
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Adrian Farrel
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… ao.ting
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Shwetha Bhandari (shwethab)
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Joel M. Halpern