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Re: [Sframe] "AES-GCM" with secure short tags

Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> Tue, 28 March 2023 02:23 UTC

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Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 11:23:21 +0900
From: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: sframe@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Sframe] "AES-GCM" with secure short tags
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Thanks John,

Though SFrame (though maybe SRTP more so) would be a very good driver for this, but the CFRG is the right place to start.  We're not chartered to document new cryptographic modes, though we might be willing to cheer from the sidelines.

On Mon, Mar 27, 2023, at 18:15, John Mattsson wrote:
> Benjamin Beurdouche wrote:
>>Could you point us at the papers for these analysis please ?
>
> The ETSI SAGE documents are not public yet. As there seem to be 
> interest I will try to submit information (likely in draft form) to 
> CFRG as soon as possible.
>
> Richard Barnes wrote:
>>I expect something truncatable would be of interest for a variety of media-encryption things (SRTP, SFrame, MoQ, et al.).  Audio packets are small, numerous, and ephemeral, so on the one hand, they are very sensitive in percentage terms to crypto overhead, and on the other hand, you don't care a ton about forgery of any individual packet.
>
> Yes, that a good overview. I agree.
>
> John
>
> *From: *Benjamin Beurdouche <ietf@beurdouche.com>
> *Date: *Monday, 27 March 2023 at 18:04
> *To: *John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
> *Cc: *sframe@ietf.org <sframe@ietf.org>
> *Subject: *Re: [Sframe] "AES-GCM" with secure short tags
> Hi John,
>
>
>> Would SFRAME WG be interested in such an algorithm (AES-GCM with trucatable tags)? If so I could submit such a draft to to CFRG. ETSI SAGE has done quite a lot of security analysis on this.
> 
> Could you point us at the papers for these analysis please ?
> 
> Many thanks !
> Benjamin
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