Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-10.txt> (Securing RPSL Objects with RPKI Signatures) to Proposed Standard

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Thu, 12 May 2016 11:34 UTC

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Date: Thu, 12 May 2016 13:33:57 +0200
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-10.txt> (Securing RPSL Objects with RPKI Signatures) to Proposed Standard
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> But regardless of process. For this to be useful for route objects we
> need two signatures in cases where the AS and prefix are held by
> different parties.

then we have misplaced this whole discussion.  it is really about using
rpki keys to sign rpsl data willy-nilly, as opposed to using the rpki
infrastructure.

the rpki-based origin validation and bgpsec models specifically do not
authenticate the authority of an AS.  the AS does that by announcing.

i happen to be in the building having post lunch coffee.  wanna chat
face to face?  bring clue bat.

randy