[sidr] suggested text for adverse actions

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Wed, 06 April 2016 18:23 UTC

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From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Date: Wed, 06 Apr 2016 14:23:31 -0400
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Subject: [sidr] suggested text for adverse actions
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To address the topic Tim B. raised wrt the IRR system, and n light of 
the comments
provided by the cognizant routing AD, I propose adding the following 
text as a
second paragraph in the Security Considerations section.

Unless I hear suggestions otherwise, I'll add this text before we submit 
this as
we post the I-D as a WG document.

Steve
-------

The analysis in this document identifies a number of circumstances in 
which attacks or errors can have significant impacts on routing. One 
ought not interpret this as a condemnation of the RPKI. It is only an 
attempt to document the implications of a wide range of attacks and 
errors, in the context of the RPKI. The primary alternative mechanism 
for disseminating routing information is Internet Routing Registry (IRR) 
technology [RFC2650, RFC2725], which uses the Routing Policy 
Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2622]. The IRR technology exhibits its 
own set of security problems, which are discussed in [RFC7682].