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Re: [sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation-00.txt

Oleg Muravskiy <oleg@ripe.net> Mon, 21 March 2016 22:38 UTC

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From: Oleg Muravskiy <oleg@ripe.net>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation-00.txt
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This is a WG-adopted version of the previous individual submission ID draft-tbruijnzeels-sidr-validation-local-cache-02. It includes feedback submitted so far, and some sections that were missing in the previous version.

Please read and comment!


Oleg


On 21 Mar 2016, at 21:29, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing of the IETF.
> 
>        Title           : RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by a Relying Party Tool
>        Authors         : Oleg Muravskiy
>                          Tim Bruijnzeels
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation-00.txt
> 	Pages           : 11
> 	Date            : 2016-03-21
> 
> Abstract:
>   This document currently describes the approach to validate the
>   content of the RPKI certificate tree, as used by the RIPE NCC RPKI
>   Validator.  This approach is independent of a particular object
>   retrieval mechanism.  This allows it to be used with repositories
>   available over the rsync protocol, the RPKI Repository Delta
>   Protocol, and repositories that use a mix of both.
> 
>   This algorithm does not rely on content of repository directories,
>   but uses the Authority Key Identifier (AKI) field of a manifest and a
>   certificate revocation list (CRL) objects to discover manifest and
>   CRL objects issued by a particular Certificate Authority (CA).  It
>   further uses the hashes of manifest entries to discover other objects
>   issued by the CA.
> 
>   If the working group finds that algorithm outlined here is useful for
>   other implementations, we may either update future revisions of this
>   document to be less specific to the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
>   implementation, or we may use this document as a starting point of a
>   generic validation document and keep this as a detailed description
>   of the actual RIPE NCC RPKI Validator implementation.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation/
> 
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-tree-validation-00
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
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> 



Cheers,
Oleg

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