Re: [Sidr] Rsync

"Michele (Mike) Hjorleifsson" <mikeh@aepnetworks.com> Wed, 19 March 2008 02:11 UTC

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From: "Michele (Mike) Hjorleifsson" <mikeh@aepnetworks.com>
To: Geoff Huston <gih@apnic.net>
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Subject: Re: [Sidr] Rsync
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I believe the conversation was centered around write access, to ensure  
an unauthorized individual couldnt corrupt the repository

On Mar 18, 2008, at 18:00 , Geoff Huston wrote:

>> On Tue, 18 Mar 2008, Stephen Kent wrote:
>>> At 9:55 AM +1000 3/18/08, Robert Loomans wrote:
>> <snip>
>>> It has been suggested that access to repositories might be
>>> TLS-protected, even though the data is intended to be widely
>>> available.  The motivation is that requiring a TLS credential  
>>> (issued
>>> under the RPKI) could be used to reject DoS attacks by complete
>>> outsiders.
>
>
> Perhaps the clarifying question is: are you talking about read  
> access or write access?
>
> The comments I've seen that support the notion of no need for TLS  
> support appear to refer to read access, where anyone can be a  
> relying party and the combination of manifests and digital  
> signatures on retrieved objects is sufficient to ensure that the  
> relying party can determine the completeness and validity of the  
> retrieved information.
>
> The comments I've seen in favour of TLS appear to refer to write  
> access where a CA or EE has outsouced the publication repository  
> management function to a third party and there may be some need for  
> a secured channel of write access as a means of DOS protection.
>
> The drafts on this topic (draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct-01.txt, and  
> draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-09.txt) refer only to read access.
>
>
>

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