Re: [sidr] Protocol Action: 'BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-11.txt)

Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net> Sat, 04 March 2017 03:59 UTC

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Date: Fri, 03 Mar 2017 22:59:20 -0500
Message-ID: <yj9oo9xhr8tj.wl%morrowc@ops-netman.net>
From: Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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References: <148414831932.11019.14685466226406323027.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <904eb4e5f3b54f8fb5eeddba482566c6@XCH-ALN-014.cisco.com> <AF3156BF-6CC9-4DDF-8C7A-4D6EDB9668AB@cisco.com> <D4DF2B46.74CF0%dougm@nist.gov> <m27f45x5jx.wl-randy@psg.com>
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Cc: "draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling@ietf.org>, "sidr@ietf.org" <sidr@ietf.org>, "sidr-chairs@ietf.org" <sidr-chairs@ietf.org>, "sandy@tislabs.com" <sandy@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: [sidr] Protocol Action: 'BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-11.txt)
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At Sat, 04 Mar 2017 09:13:22 +0900,
Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:
> 
> i am very confused.  what is the actual problem here?
> 
> if the community arrives at a router that has computed a validation
> state from local data, the community's state must be ignored.
> 
> does the spec need to be clarified in this aspect?  if so, text would be
> helpful.

It sounds like implementers are unsure if the 3rd back sentence is
correct/intended. How about:

Section 2, 3rd paragraph:

  "Similarly on the receiving IBGP speakers, the validation
   state of an IBGP route SHOULD be derived directly from the last octet
   of the extended community, if present."

to:
 "Similarly on the receiving IBGP speakers, the validation state of
  an IBGP route SHOULD be derived directly from the last octet of the
  extended community, if present. A receiving router should use
  locally achieved validation state before trusting an IBGP neighbors
  state information."

-chris