Re: [sidr] suggested amendment to draft-ymbk-bgpsec-reqs

Sandra Murphy wrote on 01-04-11 22:24:
> 
> 
> On Fri, 1 Apr 2011, Andrei Robachevsky wrote:
> 
>> Hi,
>>
>> I propose the inclusion of the following requirement:
>>
>> 3.x A BGPsec design should not decrease the performance characteristics
>> of the BGP, nor have a negative impact on the overall resilience of the
>> routing system.
> 
> Could you say how strictly you would want this requirement interpreted?
> For example, I would say that not even TCP-AO has NO impact on
> performance and resilience.  Do you want the requirement to forbid TCP-AO?
> 
> --Sandy, speaking as wg co-chair
> 

I agree with the comments on the list, it was more a strawman. How about
a more moderate requirement:

3.x A BGPsec design MUST provide analysis of the operational
considerations for deployment with respect to the impact on the
performance characteristics and the overall resilience of the routing
system. 	

This may be already implied in 3.3, but I'd like to make these two
aspects more explicit.

> 
> 
>>
>> Examples that I have in mind is the convergence time or a solution that
>> can make the global routing system more fragile (e.g. an expired
>> signature blacking out a significant part of the Internet). Perhaps that
>> should also be covered in the deployment considerations, since this
>> depends partly on local policy decisions.
>>
>> Andrei
>> _______________________________________________
>> sidr mailing list
>> sidr@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
>>

Andrei