[sidr] Last Draft: ReCharter text

[Christopher Morrow <[e-mail]>]

Ok, so a lot (102 messages on-list) was said about the recharter text here:

= = = = = = = = =

Description of Working Group:

The purpose of the SIDR working group is to reduce vulnerabilities in
the inter-domain routing system. The two vulnerabilities that will be
addressed are:

  * Is an Autonomous System (AS) authorized to originate an IP prefix
  * Is the AS-Path represented in the route the same as the path
       through which the route update traveled

The SIDR working group will take practical deployability into consideration.

Building upon the already completed and implemented framework:

  * Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
  * Distribution of RPKI data to routing devices and its use in
       operational networks
  * Document the use of certification objects within the secure
       routing architecture


This working group will specify security enhancements for inter-domain
routing protocols.

The SIDR working group is charged with the following goals and
milestones:
ID Date      Pub Date
Mar 2011   Jan 2012  An overview of the RPKI and BGP Protocol changes
required for origin and path validation
Mar 2011   Jun 2012  A document describing threats to the routing system
Mar 2011   Jun 2012  A requirements document that  addresses these threats
Mar2011    Jan 2012  Document the BGP protocol enhancements that meet
the security requirements
Nov 2010    Jul 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops
Mar 2011   Jul 2012   Operational deployment guidance for network operators
Jun 2011    Dec 2011 System and architecture design choices made in
the protocol and RPKI
Mar 2010    Mar 2012   draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs
Mar 2010    Mar 2012   draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp
Nov 2010    Jan 2012   draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate
Jan 2010    Jun 2011    draft-ietf-sidr-publication
Nov 2010    Jun 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct
Nov 2010    Jun 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format
Feb 2011    Jun 2011    draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr
Nov 2010    Nov 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt
Dec 2010    Oct 2011   draft-rgaglian-sidr-algorithm-agility
Jan 2011    Oct 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters
Jan 2010    Dec 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-keyroll
Jan 2010    May 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-arch
Jan 2010    May 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-cp
Jan 2010    May 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs
Jan 2010    Jun 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation
Jan 2010    Jun 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object
Jan 2010    Jun 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests
Jan 2010    Jul 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs
Jan 2010    Jul 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-rescerts-provisioning
Jan 2010    Aug 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-ta


==================

o Of that text, I noticed no argument about the
dates/drafts/work-items, I noticed at least some
   discussion about the second vulnerability to address: (let's call
it a goal for now)

----------------------------------------------------------
 * Is the AS-Path represented in the route the same as the path
       through which the route update traveled
----------------------------------------------------------

A few folks noted that perhaps 'route' was not the right word here,
perhaps NLRI is. Using a wikipedia definition:
"Once a BGP session is running, the BGP speakers exchange UPDATE
messages about destinations to which the speaker offers connectivity.
In the protocol, the basic CIDR route description is called Network
Layer Reachability Information (NLRI). NLRI includes the expected
destination prefix, prefix length, path of autonomous systems to the
destination and next hop in attributes, which can carry a wide range
of additional information that affects the acceptance policy of the
receiving router. BGP speakers incrementally announce new NLRI to
which they offer reachability, but also announce withdrawals of
prefixes to which the speaker no longer offers connectivity."

This seems mostly correct, we don't actually want to secure something
that changes per router-hop (potentially) - next-hop, but we do care
about prefix/length/as-path. Taking that into account changes the goal
to:


----------------------------------------------------------
* Is the AS-Path represented in the NLRI the same as the path through
which the NLRI traveled
----------------------------------------------------------

o At least one respondent noted that some/all of the work here, as it
affects the
   BGP specification will have to be seen/etc by IDR, I don't think the charter
   changes as proposed preclude that. I believe the intent was to pass
along all
   changes to IDR to make sure they don't see issues with the changes. It's
   probably fair to also point out that the current IDR chair acks th
two goals listed,
   but still the material relevant to IDR should go there for
checkbox/changes/etc.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the above the new charter reads:


= = = = = = = = =

Description of Working Group:

The purpose of the SIDR working group is to reduce vulnerabilities in
the inter-domain routing system. The two vulnerabilities that will be
addressed are:

  * Is an Autonomous System (AS) authorized to originate an IP prefix
  * Is the AS-Path represented in the NLRI the same as the path
     through which the NLRI traveled

The SIDR working group will take practical deployability into consideration.

Building upon the already completed and implemented framework:

  * Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
  * Distribution of RPKI data to routing devices and its use in
       operational networks
  * Document the use of certification objects within the secure
       routing architecture


This working group will specify security enhancements for inter-domain
routing protocols.

The SIDR working group is charged with the following goals and
milestones:
ID Date      Pub Date
Mar 2011   Jan 2012  An overview of the RPKI and BGP Protocol changes
required for origin and path validation
Mar 2011   Jun 2012  A document describing threats to the routing system
Mar 2011   Jun 2012  A requirements document that  addresses these threats
Mar2011    Jan 2012  Document the BGP protocol enhancements that meet
the security requirements
Nov 2010    Jul 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops
Mar 2011   Jul 2012   Operational deployment guidance for network operators
Jun 2011    Dec 2011 System and architecture design choices made in
the protocol and RPKI
Mar 2010    Mar 2012   draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs
Mar 2010    Mar 2012   draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp
Nov 2010    Jan 2012   draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate
Jan 2010    Jun 2011    draft-ietf-sidr-publication
Nov 2010    Jun 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct
Nov 2010    Jun 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format
Feb 2011    Jun 2011    draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr
Nov 2010    Nov 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt
Dec 2010    Oct 2011   draft-rgaglian-sidr-algorithm-agility
Jan 2011    Oct 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters
Jan 2010    Dec 2011   draft-ietf-sidr-keyroll
Jan 2010    May 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-arch
Jan 2010    May 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-cp
Jan 2010    May 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs
Jan 2010    Jun 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation
Jan 2010    Jun 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object
Jan 2010    Jun 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests
Jan 2010    Jul 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs
Jan 2010    Jul 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-rescerts-provisioning
Jan 2010    Aug 2011  draft-ietf-sidr-ta


==================

This I'll send along to the IESG shortly.

-Chris