[sidr] Alexey Melnikov's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-delta-protocol-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Alexey Melnikov <aamelnikov@fastmail.fm> Thu, 02 March 2017 11:04 UTC

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Subject: [sidr] Alexey Melnikov's Discuss on draft-ietf-sidr-delta-protocol-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Alexey Melnikov has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidr-delta-protocol-07: Discuss

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I would be happy to ballot Yes on this document, as it is well written
and is a useful piece of work. However I have one issue (and a few minor
comments) that I would like to DISCUSS before doing so:

In Section 5.3 the document says:

   It is RECOMMENDED that Relying Parties and Publication Servers
   the Best Current Practices outlined in [RFC7525] on the use of HTTP
   over TLS (HTTPS) [RFC2818].

RFC 7525 is referencing RFC 6125 for server hostname validation.
Unfortunately this is not detailed enough to perform hostname validation,
because reference to RFC 6125 requires specifying answers to every
question in section 3 of RFC 6125. (And there is no generic RFC that
specifies how this is done for protocols using HTTP.) One example of how
this might look like is in Section 9.2 of
For your convenience the relevant text is pasted below:

   Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using
   subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to
   man-in-the-middle attacks.  The rules and guidelines defined in
   [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations:

      Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity
      in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server
      and client implementations which use TLS.  Certification
      authorities which issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support
      the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST
      present in rpki-rtr server certificates.

      DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the
      wildcard character "*".

      rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID
      identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server
      subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the
      rules described in [RFC6125].

The only thing missing from the above is explicit mentioning that SRV-ID
and URI-ID are not used. (I think the same should apply to your


In 3.2: HTTPS reference is out-of-date.

SHA-256 needs a reference.

The shepherding write up says that the schema was not validated. Why not?