[sidr] WGLC on draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12 (ENDS 29-Oct-2015)

Sandra Murphy <sandy@tislabs.com> Fri, 16 October 2015 01:26 UTC

Return-Path: <sandy@tislabs.com>
X-Original-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF5921ACF08 for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 15 Oct 2015 18:26:36 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.911
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.911 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oeE0SeDIB2Iv for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 15 Oct 2015 18:26:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from walnut.tislabs.com (walnut.tislabs.com [192.94.214.200]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 74F391ACF02 for <sidr@ietf.org>; Thu, 15 Oct 2015 18:26:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from nova.tislabs.com (unknown [10.66.1.77]) by walnut.tislabs.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 955CE28B0043 for <sidr@ietf.org>; Thu, 15 Oct 2015 21:26:34 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from [IPv6:::1] (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by nova.tislabs.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 67C8F1F8035; Thu, 15 Oct 2015 21:26:34 -0400 (EDT)
From: Sandra Murphy <sandy@tislabs.com>
X-Pgp-Agent: GPGMail 2.5.1
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_547C3A52-C6F1-4B97-A18A-9E31A87ED096"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg="pgp-sha512"
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 21:26:37 -0400
Message-Id: <B184011E-E167-4C68-A7D7-EB6A012CF152@tislabs.com>
To: sidr wg list <sidr@ietf.org>
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 7.3 \(1878.6\))
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1878.6)
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidr/nsF0Wj0Et9pEujbSqNlamDUFkWY>
Cc: Sandra Murphy <sandy@tislabs.com>
Subject: [sidr] WGLC on draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12 (ENDS 29-Oct-2015)
X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing <sidr.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/sidr/>
List-Post: <mailto:sidr@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 01:26:37 -0000

The chairs and the authors believe that  draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12 is mature and has stabilized.

This message starts a WGLC for  draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles, which will end 29-October-2015.

Please review the draft and send comments to the list, and say whether you believe it is ready for publication.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles


A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests

Abstract

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
   the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
   in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
   protocol known as BGPsec.  BGP is a critical component for the proper
   operation of the Internet as a whole.  The BGPsec protocol is under
   development as a component to address the requirement to provide
   security for the BGP protocol.  The goal of BGPsec is to design a
   protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong
   cryptographic primitives.  The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
   by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
   (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
   Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
   System (AS) or ASes.  The certificate asserts that the router(s)
   holding the private key are authorized to send out secure route
   advertisements on behalf of the specified AS(es).  This document also
   profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format
   of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate
   path validation procedures.  The document extends the RPKI;
   therefore, this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates
   Profile ( RFC 6487).

—Sandy, speaking as one of the wg co-chairs