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Re: [sidr] preventing SKI collisions

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Fri, 07 August 2015 10:35 UTC

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Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 19:35:21 +0900
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] preventing SKI collisions
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> This change would require certificates to be re-issued (or possibly
> keys to be rolled) all the way down from Trust Anchors. When the
> parent CA re-issues a certificate for the child CA with a new style
> SKI, then the child will have to re-issue its products with a new AKI.
> 
> This is not impossible, but not trivial either. Especially if a
> delegated model is used.

have we done a dnssec-v1?  we should be able to change hashes without a
flag day.  if not, we need to think.

randy

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