[Sidrops] Re: [GROW] Peering API Discovery

Tim Bruijnzeels <tbruijnzeels@ripe.net> Fri, 23 August 2024 08:45 UTC

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From: Tim Bruijnzeels <tbruijnzeels@ripe.net>
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Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 10:45:41 +0200
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To: Q Misell <q@as207960.net>
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CC: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>, grow@ietf.org, sidrops@ietf.org
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Subject: [Sidrops] Re: [GROW] Peering API Discovery
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Hi Q, all,

> On 16 Aug 2024, at 11:11, Q Misell <q@as207960.net> wrote:
> 
> > But it’s still not clear to me what the challenge would look like.
> 
> It might help to look over my attempt at defining this in my PR: https://github.com/bgp/draft-ietf-peering-api/pull/30
> 

At a glance… yes something like this would help to make it more clear.

As for the proposed mechanism - I don’t get the full picture yet, and have
not had the time to really dive into it. Generally speaking I think it may also
need an RSC signed by the server to prove its holdership of its ASN. And
you probably need to allow for some time to get an RSC signed by an RPKI
CA (i.e. perhaps don’t expect synchronous signing). Furthermore, you
likely want to use RSCs for an initial handshake only but use some other
token later (but I think this is what OAuth2 will do anyway).

More importantly though, rather than wanting to express a strong opinion
at this point about *how* this should work, I think it’s important *that* this
is specified clearly. Yes, I can wait for a future version of the document :)

Tim