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[Sidrops] Welcome your attention and any comments // FW: New Version Notification for draft-shen-sidrops-region-verification-00.txt

"Wanghaibo (Rainsword)" <rainsword.wang@huawei.com> Fri, 09 July 2021 02:05 UTC

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From: "Wanghaibo (Rainsword)" <rainsword.wang@huawei.com>
To: "sidrops@ietf.org" <sidrops@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Welcome your attention and any comments // FW: New Version Notification for draft-shen-sidrops-region-verification-00.txt
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Date: Fri, 09 Jul 2021 02:05:18 +0000
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Subject: [Sidrops] Welcome your attention and any comments // FW: New Version Notification for draft-shen-sidrops-region-verification-00.txt
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Hi All,

We have published a new draft of region verifcation recently.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shen-sidrops-region-verification/

This is also introduced in the APNIC 50.
https://conference.apnic.net/50/assets/files/APCS790/BGP-Routing-Security-Region-based-Trust-Alliance-Validation.pdf

Welcome your comments and suggestions


Abstract:
   BGP routing security is becoming a major issue that affects the
   normal running of Internet services.  Currently, there are many
   solutions, including ROA authentication and ASPA authentication, to
   prevent route source hijacking, path hijacking, and route leaking.
   However, on an actual network, large ISPs with multiple ASes can use
   carefully constructed routes to bypass ROA and ASPA authentication to
   attack the target network.

   This document defines an region-based authentication method for large
   ISPs with many ASes to prevent traffic hijacking within ISPs.

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