[Sidrops] Re: Master's thesis paper: PQC for the RPKI (and the"'null scheme")

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Thu, 03 July 2025 18:35 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2025 14:34:56 -0400
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To: Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net>
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CC: IETF SIDRops <sidrops@ietf.org>, dirk.doesburg@sidn.nl
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Subject: [Sidrops] Re: Master's thesis paper: PQC for the RPKI (and the"'null scheme")
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Maybe we need an Hackaton project to try RFC 6489 with APQC algorithms.

Russ


> On Jun 26, 2025, at 10:15 AM, Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net> wrote:
> 
> Dear working group,
> 
> I'd like to bring an interesting research paper to your attention:
> "Post-Quantum Cryptography for the RPKI" authored by Dirk Doesburg.
> The paper is attached to this message, a summary is available here:
> https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/thesis-pqc-for-the-rpki
> 
> I'm pleased to see more research has been conducted on the topic of
> algorithm agility in the RPKI. To me the problem space isn't so much
> about "which algorithm to pick next?", but rather "how do we ever go
> about deploying any new algorithm?". This paper provides many helpful
> insights.
> 
> The paper also challenges the RPKI's current approach to signature
> placement. The author argues there may be an unnecessary repetition in
> the construction of Signed Objects, that a certain process step can
> perhaps be fully subsumed in another feature and in doing so offset the
> cost of a more resource intensive signature scheme (which most PQ
> schemes are), or ... we just take the resulting shrinkage as a win. :)
> 
> However, this proposed "null scheme" currently is entirely theoretical
> in nature: as of yet no test objects have been generated. As I'm very
> interested in the RPKI's performance, I'd love to contribute to a
> proof-of-concept to better understand the feasability of the proposed
> approach and any potential trade-offs. The claims on robustness and
> security properties will of course need to be verified and
> triple-checked. Stay tuned for future updates.
> 
> Thank you Dirk for sharing your work with the world!
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Job
>