Re: [Sidrops] request for feedback draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-asgroup-00

Ties de Kock <tdekock@ripe.net> Wed, 16 November 2022 12:57 UTC

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From: Ties de Kock <tdekock@ripe.net>
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Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 13:56:35 +0100
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To: Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] request for feedback draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-asgroup-00
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Hi Job,

> On 16 Nov 2022, at 13:44, Job Snijders <job=40fastly.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> Dear all,
> 
> As recently discussing in RIPE's db-wg [1] and routing-wg [2],
> considerable operational heartburn arises from AS-SET objects with
> same names/different content existing in multiple IRR databases.
> Ultimately this is a namespace/authorization problem, worsened by the
> lack of object security.
> 
> The lack of an analogy of IRR 'as-set' functionality in the RPKI appears
> to be significant barrier for the industry to migrate towards the
> ability to run operations in an IRR-free mode. Many ISPs end up having
> to use both IRR and RPKI to run their network, this IRR<>RPKI dual
> dependency makes for painful complications. All IRR data ultimately is
> unverifiable plain text without signatures. 
> 
> We put together a proposal to port the IRR 'as-set' class object
> functionality to the RPKI framework; leveraging authorization through
> validating a chain of AS Identifier extensions; resolve object naming
> collisions; and additionally provide an opt-out mechanism. We imagine
> the UI for operators could be very similar to IRR AS-SET edit forms.

Interesting to describe this in the RPKI.

Do you know a good/authoritative description of the data model of AS-SETs in the
IRR? That would help me in evaluating this draft.

One nit, section 5, step 5:It would be clearer to me to use language here that
the extension MUST NOT be present in the EE certificate (the inverse of 5.4).

Kind regards,
Ties
> 
> This proposal might be reminiscent of ASCONES, but there a few
> notable differences: the ASGroup ASN.1 formal notations are more
> thorough; there is no ambiguity about who signs what; AS Cones had 4
> validation modes, ASGroups only has 1 (which simplifies the concept);
> AS-CONES attempted to port both IRR 'autnum: + as-set:' functionality in
> one go - ASGroup on the other hand only attempts to port IRR 'as-set'
> functionality (another simplification); finally - ASCONES's opt-out
> mechanism is e-mail based, whereas ASGroups provides an RPKI-native
> approach.
> 
> Relationship to ASPA: in ASPA the Autonomous System Number resource
> holder attests who their upstreams are; and perhaps ASGroups should be
> considered as a building block to allow publication of attestations "in
> the other direction". This can help increase precision in building
> filters. Today many operators signal IRR AS-SET names through
> out-of-band means such as PeeringDB or Service Order Forms; we
> anticipate that ASGroups can satisify that particular need (in addition
> to other future applications).
> 
> Your feedback is much appreciated, we'd love to continue work on this as
> a working group document.
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Job & Fredrik
> 
> [1]: https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/db-wg/2022-November/007646.html
> [2]: https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2022-November/004649.html
> 
> ----- Forwarded message from internet-drafts@ietf.org -----
> 
> Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 02:30:22 -0800
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> To: Fredrik Korsbäck <fkback@amazon.com>, Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-asgroup-00.txt
> 
> A new version of I-D, draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-asgroup-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Job Snijders and posted to the
> IETF repository.
> 
> Name:		draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-asgroup
> Revision:	00
> Title:		A profile for RPKI Signed Groupings of Autonomous System Numbers (ASGroup)
> Document date:	2022-11-16
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		17
> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-asgroup-00.txt
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-asgroup/
> Html:           https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-asgroup-00.html
> Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-asgroup
> 
> 
> Abstract:
>   This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected
>   content type for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
>   (RPKI) to carry a general-purpose listing of Autonomous System
>   Numbers (ASNs) and/or pointers to other groupings of ASNs, called an
>   ASGroup.  Additionally, the document specifies a mechanism for ASN
>   holders to opt-out of being listed in a given ASGroup.  The objective
>   is to offer a RPKI-based successor to plain-text RFC 2622 'as-set'
>   class objects.  When validated, an ASGroup confirms that the
>   respective ASN holder produced the ASGroup object.
> 
> The IETF Secretariat
> 
> ----- End forwarded message -----
> 
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