Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-09.txt

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Mon, 07 March 2022 18:17 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Mon, 07 Mar 2022 13:13:46 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-09.txt
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The revised ASN.1 does not compile.  There are two OPTIONAL TAKey values in a row (predecessor and successor).  If only one of them is present, the receiver canntt tell which one the sender wanted to include.

The following fixes the problem:

   TAK ::= SEQUENCE {	
      version     INTEGER DEFAULT 0,	
      current     TAKey,
      predecessor [0] TAKey OPTIONAL,
      successor   [1] TAKey OPTIONAL	
   }

Russ


> On Mar 6, 2022, at 9:02 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> 
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations WG of the IETF.
> 
>        Title           : RPKI Signed Object for Trust Anchor Key
>        Authors         : Carlos Martinez
>                          George G. Michaelson
>                          Tom Harrison
>                          Tim Bruijnzeels
>                          Rob Austein
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-09.txt
> 	Pages           : 18
> 	Date            : 2022-03-06
> 
> Abstract:
>   A Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) is used by Relying Parties (RPs) in the
>   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to locate and validate a
>   Trust Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) certificate used in
>   RPKI validation.  This document defines an RPKI signed object for a
>   Trust Anchor Key (TAK), that can be used by a TA to signal the
>   location(s) of the accompanying CA certificate for the current key to
>   RPs, as well as the successor key and the location(s) of its CA
>   certificate.  This object helps to support planned key rolls without
>   impacting RPKI validation.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal/
> 
> There is also an HTML version available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-09.html
> 
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-09
> 
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts
>