[Sidrops] RFC 8360 / 6487 (Was: RPKI Outage Post-Mortem)

Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net> Tue, 12 January 2021 18:56 UTC

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Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 19:27:27 +0000
From: Job Snijders <job@sobornost.net>
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Subject: [Sidrops] RFC 8360 / 6487 (Was: RPKI Outage Post-Mortem)
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Dear group (specifically George, Geoff, Tim, Carlos, Andrew & Daniel),

I'd like to ask SIDROPS to read this message
https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2021-January/004220.html
(please ignore point 1 & 2 as those are now resolved) 

What is the current plan to get RFC 8360 deployed at scale? Is this on
anyone's radar?

The spec has in the making for ~ 8 years and seems to contain a lot of
valuable insight. To me RFC 8360 seems to be to RPKI what RFC 7606 is to
BGP. A revision to increase operational robustness, except... 7606
actually got deployed :-)

Which of the Trust Anchor will be first to flip the switch?

Or... do CA implementers & operators consider jumping to the new RFC
8360 codepoint too risky of a move... and should an alternative strategy
be devised?

Was it (in hindsight) a mistake to not deprecate RFC 6487, but instead
specify a new optional alternative policy?

Kind regards,

Job