Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-15.txt

gengnan <gengnan@huawei.com> Mon, 17 July 2023 10:46 UTC

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From: gengnan <gengnan@huawei.com>
To: "Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed)" <kotikalapudi.sriram=40nist.gov@dmarc.ietf.org>
CC: "sidrops@ietf.org" <sidrops@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-15.txt
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Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2023 10:46:34 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-15.txt
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Hi Sriram,

Thanks for the v-15 draft. 

Some small suggestions:
1) For easy understanding, there can be more descriptions on how the BGP roles are used in verification. For path verification purposes, BGP roles are introduced, while they are not used in section 6. Also, the Verification at Egress eBGP Router should be taken from the perspective of the next-hop AS's BGP Role. 
2) RFC9234 should also be an existing technology in sec. 10. I am interested that whether RFC9234 for preventing and detecting route leaks is necessary if ASPA is deployed. There are overlaps of them. 


Best,
Nan

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sidrops <sidrops-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Sriram, Kotikalapudi
> (Fed)
> Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2023 11:06 PM
> To: sidrops@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-15.txt
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> An updated version 15 has been uploaded.
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-15
> 
> The changes in v-15 are:
> 
> 1. Updates due to the removal of afiLimit from the ASPA profile.
> 
> 2. Incorporates comments (very helpful) that continued to come after the
> formal WGLC period.
> 
> 3. Sections 7 and 8 are better organized.
> 
> 4. New Section 7.2 "Verification and Mitigation at Egress eBGP Router".  This
> section extends what RFC 8893 did for RPKI-ROV to ASPA-based AS_PATH
> verification.
> 
> 5. New Section 9.4 "DoS/DDoS Mitigation Service Provider".
> 
> 6. Other edits for text improvements.
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> Sriram
> 
> ------------------------
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
> This Internet-Draft is a work item of the SIDR Operations
> (SIDROPS) WG of the IETF.
> 
>    Title           : BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System
> Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects
>    Authors         : Alexander Azimov
>                      Eugene Bogomazov
>                      Randy Bush
>                      Keyur Patel
>                      Job Snijders
>                      Kotikalapudi Sriram
>    Filename        : draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-15.txt
>    Pages           : 23
>    Date            : 2023-07-10
> 
> Abstract:
>    This document describes procedures that make use of Autonomous System
>    Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects in the Resource Public Key
>    Infrastructure (RPKI) to verify the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
>    AS_PATH attribute of advertised routes.  This type of AS_PATH
>    verification provides detection and mitigation of route leaks and
>    improbable AS paths.  It also to some degree provides protection
>    against prefix hijacks with forged-origin or forged-path-segment.
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification/
> 
> There is also an htmlized version available at:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-15
> 
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-15
> 
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