[Sip] Re: WGLC comments for draft-ietf-sip-consent-framework-00

Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com> Thu, 26 October 2006 07:24 UTC

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Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2006 10:24:29 +0300
From: Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>
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Cc: Sip List <sip@ietf.org>, Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com>
Subject: [Sip] Re: WGLC comments for draft-ietf-sip-consent-framework-00
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Hi Ben,

>>> 6. IANA Considerations (editorial) Shouldn't we have some text or
>>> a table showing where these new header fields are allowed? Also,
>>> to show for which methods the 470 response is allowed.?
>> 
>> My personal opinion is that those tables are typically out of date 
>> shortly after they are created and, thus, are useless most of the
>> time. I would prefer not to add them.
> 
> Do you object to the format or the content of such tables?

many people complain that the format of those tables make them difficult
to understand, but I was talking about their content. As soon as a new
method o a new response code is created, those tables are typically out
of date. Usually, it is enough if drafts explain header fields'
restrictions using normative text.

In any case, I do not think we need such tables for this particular draft.


>> When store-and-forward servers are used, the interface between a
>> user agent and its store-and-forward server may not be based on
>> SIP. In such case, SIPS cannot be used to secure those URIs. It
>> MUST be possible for store-and-forward servers to deliver encrypted
>> and integrity-protected messages to their user agents.
>> 
>> 
> 
> Can we put normative requirements on the piece of the architecture
> that may or may not exist? This is sort of like pinning the tail on
> the rumor of a donkey. My point was really that we need to document
> that the security issue exists, depending on what these devices do,
> rather than to state what they must do.


I believe putting a requirement on the type of store and forward server
that can be used with this framework is completely OK. However, if you
would like to remove the normative MUST, we can do that. Feel free to
edit the paragraph I proposed so that you are happy with it.

Thanks,

Gonzalo


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