Re: [sipcore] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-token-authnz-15: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 05 May 2020 19:10 UTC
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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 05 May 2020 15:10:28 -0400
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-token-authnz@ietf.org, sipcore-chairs@ietf.org, SIPCORE <sipcore@ietf.org>, Jean Mahoney <mahoney@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [sipcore] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-token-authnz-15: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Inline... On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 2:46 PM Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker < noreply@ietf.org> wrote: > Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-token-authnz-15: Discuss > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-token-authnz/ > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > DISCUSS: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks for the updates in the -14 (and -15); they cover most of my points. > > Unfortunately, the new security considerations text seems to introduce a > problematic recommendation: > > Because of that, it is critical to make sure that extra security > measures be taken to safeguard credentials used for Single Sign-On. > Examples of such measures include long passphrase instead of a > password, enabling multi-factor factor authentication, and the use of > embedded browser when possible, as defined in [RFC8252]. > > Looking at RFC 8252 (Section 8.12), it seems to be rather strongly > recommending > to *not* use an embedded browser, which is the opposite of the apparent > recommendation here. Are we missing a word "avoiding" or similar? > > Yeah, this should have been "browser" not "embedded browser". We will remove the "embedded browser" and replace it with "the native platform browser". > Also, I am not 100% sure my note about refresh tokens was fully addressed; > in Section 2.1.1 we see: > > The refresh token is only used between the UAC and the AS. If the AS > provides a refresh token to the UAC, the UAC uses it to request a new > access token and refresh token from the AS before the currently used > access token expires ([RFC6749], Section 1.5). If the AS does not > > Is it accurate to say that the refresh token is used "to request a new > access > token and refresh token" (specifically the "and refresh token" part)? I > know that > it is not always returned, but am less sure about whether the semantics > always > include an (implicit) request for a new one. > Returning a refresh token is based on AS policy. We will remove the "and refresh token". > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Some other comments on the new text that do not rise to Discuss-level. > > Thanks for adding the mention of a whitelist of trusted ASes; I would > consider > also mentioning it in Section 4 for the authz_server parameter, and/or in > the > security considerations. > > We will add that to the security consideration section. > I also would have liked to see some guidance about when one > should/shouldn't > include the realm parameter in a challenge. > > I think this is out of scope, as we are not updating or changing the existing SIP behavior on this issue. Section 2.1.1 > > UAC contacts the AS in order to obtain tokens, and includes the > requested scopes, based on a local configuration (Figure 1). The UAC > MUST check the AS URL received in the 401/407 response against a list > of trusted ASs configured on the UAC, in order to prevent several > classes of possible vulnerabilities when a client blindly attempt to > use any provided authorization. > > nits: "attempts", and maybe "any provided authorization server". > > Will fix it > Section 3 > > nit: s/claimes/claims/ > > Will fix it > Section 5 > > When a registrar chooses to challenge a REGISTER request, if the > registrar can provide access to different levels of services, it is > RECOMMENDED that the registrar includes a scope in the response in > order to indicate the minimum scope needed to register and access > basic services. The access token might include an extended scope > that gives the user access to more advanced features beyond basic > services. > > Is there anything to say about how the broader scope value might be > learned? > > In SIP, it is typically controlled by the admin, that controls the AS, and dictates the level of access for the user. We will add a sentence to that extent. Regards, Rifaat
- [sipcore] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-… Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker
- Re: [sipcore] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-i… Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
- Re: [sipcore] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-i… Christer Holmberg