Re: [sipcore] SASL Authentication for SIP

Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl> Wed, 19 October 2022 08:30 UTC

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Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2022 08:29:37 +0000
From: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: Re: [sipcore] SASL Authentication for SIP
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Hello,

I cannot really work out what the formal arrangements are
for new authentication mechanisms in SIP.  IANA lists a
Security Mechanism Names registry, but it is dedicated to
RFC 3329, a meta-protocol for negotiating what would be
available between peers.

RFC 3261 is a bit informal when it says

   SIP provides a stateless, challenge-based mechanism for
   authentication that is based on authentication in HTTP.

Does that mean that any mechanism defined for HTTP will
automatically be permissible in SIP if peers agreed on
it?  Lacking a formal registry that is what I would
assume.

Then, a specification like SIP-SASL that adds specifics
for SIP could be an Independent proposal.


FWIW, the purpose of this work is to have an end-to-end
mechanism for key derivation.  This can be useful for
private telephony, but my purpose for now is the setup
of Wireguard sessions using SIP.  The two seem to be a
match made in heaven.  Key derivation can yield a PSK
that helps the VPN combat quantum computing.


Thanks,
 -Rick