Privacy Concerns (was Re: [Sipping-emergency] RE: Civil location syntax validation - wa s RE: How to handle Validation failures)

"James M. Polk" <jmpolk@cisco.com> Wed, 29 September 2004 03:56 UTC

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Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 22:52:10 -0500
To: Jonathan Rosenberg <jdrosen@dynamicsoft.com>, "Peterson, Jon" <jon.peterson@neustar.biz>
From: "James M. Polk" <jmpolk@cisco.com>
Subject: Privacy Concerns (was Re: [Sipping-emergency] RE: Civil location syntax validation - wa s RE: How to handle Validation failures)
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At 11:04 PM 9/28/2004 -0400, Jonathan Rosenberg wrote:
>Along those lines, I think it might be a good idea to sprinkle some nice 
>words into the charter about taking into consideration privacy concerns, 
>and properly balancing them with the needs of emergency call routing.

this is what I was referring to when I made the quip about being steered.

I see this being a tracking capability.

The phone (or multimedia device in general) has to obtain an address given 
by the network and test its deliverability to a government service before 
that device will potentially ever be used for any service (not just 
911).  This means to me that "the system" always knows where the device is 
(because it always delivers an accurate and valid address to it, and that 
device test pings for reachability and accuracy of the location it is 
given, on an ongoing basis).

The periodic test ping/no-op packets ensuring a PSAP can be reached if a 
911-type session is attempted has to reveal the return addressing, 
including each user's URI.

This has huge hijacking and misuse potential written all over it, as 
Jonathan pointed out; not only in the database, but in the gleaning of 
packets to and from targets.


>-Jonathan R.
>
>--
>Jonathan D. Rosenberg, Ph.D.                600 Lanidex Plaza
>Chief Technology Officer                    Parsippany, NJ 07054-2711
>dynamicsoft
>jdrosen@dynamicsoft.com                     FAX:   (973) 952-5050
>http://www.jdrosen.net                      PHONE: (973) 952-5000
>http://www.dynamicsoft.com
>
>_______________________________________________
>Sipping-emergency mailing list
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cheers,
James

                                *******************
                 Truth is not to be argued... it is to be presented


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