[Sipping] Revised Security Considerations for cc-conferencing
"Johnston, Alan" <alan.johnston@mci.com> Thu, 19 May 2005 02:06 UTC
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Date: Thu, 19 May 2005 03:06:31 +0100
From: "Johnston, Alan" <alan.johnston@mci.com>
To: sipping <sipping@ietf.org>
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Cc: Orit Levin <oritl@microsoft.com>
Subject: [Sipping] Revised Security Considerations for cc-conferencing
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Based on AD feedback, here is a revised Security Considerations section for draft-ietf-sipping-cc-conferencing, currently in IETF Last Call. Comments and feedback are most welcome. Thanks Alan Johnston sip:alan@sipstation.com - - - 5. Security Considerations This specification defines the interaction between a focus UA and a participant UA in a conferencing application. As a result, the security considerations and mechanisms defined in RFC 3261 [RFC3261] apply. However, there are some aspects unique to conferencing which will be discussed here. A conference often involves the use of substantial network bandwidth and computing resources. As a result, authentication is even more important than in a simple peer to peer session. As discussed in the conferencing framework [framework], conferences often have policy related to conferencing resources. A focus SHOULD authenticate participants before joining them to a conference and allowing utilization of conferencing resources. Different policies can be applied by a focus to different participants based on the result of authentication. A participant will be interacting with a number of other participants through the focus. As a result, a participant should authenticate the focus and be sure that the focus used for the conference is trusted. Normal SIP authentication mechanisms are suitable for participant and focus authentication, such as SIP Digest utilizing a shared secret, or certificates, or a secured SIP identity mechanism. In addition, a focus SHOULD support Secure SIP connections so that hop by hop mutual authentication and confidentiality provided by TLS can be achieved. In the SIP dialog between them, a focus utilizes the "isfocus" feature tag to indicate that the UA is acting as a focus. As such, the SIP header fields such as Contact SHOULD have end to end integrity. A participant and focus SHOULD support an end to end integrity mechanism such as S/MIME. Once a participant has learned that the other UA is a focus, SIP call control operations (such as REFER) can be implemented, or a subscription to the conference package of the focus might be attempted. The security considerations described in RFC 3515 [RFC3515] apply to any REFER call control operations. A focus and participant will apply policy to determine which call control operations are allowed. A focus accepting subscriptions to the conference package must follow the security considerations in RFC XXXX [conf-package]. Since notifications can carry sensitive information, the subscriptions should be authenticated and the notifications delivered with confidentiality and integrity protection. Since a participant is not able to authenticate other participants directly, a participant must rely on the focus to perform this authentication. A focus MUST support a participant's request for privacy, either through conference policy or as expressed through the signaling. For example, a participant joining a conference and including a Privacy header field [RFC3323] must not have identity information revealed to other participants by the focus. If other signaling protocols are used, privacy signaled through them also must be respected. _______________________________________________ Sipping mailing list https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sipping This list is for NEW development of the application of SIP Use sip-implementors@cs.columbia.edu for questions on current sip Use sip@ietf.org for new developments of core SIP
- [Sipping] Revised Security Considerations for cc-… Johnston, Alan